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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is from the final decision and order of the 
Third Judicial Circuit Court by Judge Paul G. Grant dated 
July 31, 1990; and the final decision and order of the same 
Court on Appellant's Motion for New Trial dated September 29, 
1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. In presenting pleadings and testimony to the trial 
court did the defense counsel commit "fraud upon the court" in 
presenting evidence to justify defense assertions for a finding 
of "bad faith" against the plaintiff/appellant by the trial 
court, or make material fact misrepresentations in the pleadings 
submitted or testified thereto in open court, or otherwise 
commit misconduct, to such a level or degree that justice would 
require relief to the plaintiff under Rule 60(b)(1), (3), and 
(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, thereby rendering the 
judgement invalid? 
The standard of review for this issue is the substantive 
test of material fact, clearly erroneous standard, and abuse of 
discretion standard. 
Standards of Review, by Steven A. Childress and Martha S. 
Davis, [KF 4575 C48 (1986), §5.2 and § 5.6]. 
2. Did the plaintiff/appellant provide sufficient evi-
dence for the trial court upon his motion for a new trial to 
show merit due to unforseen circumstances under Rule 59(a)(3), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? And did the trial court abuse 
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abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff/appellants Motion 
for a New Trial? 
The standard of Review for this issue is the abuse of 
discretion standard. Standards of Review, by Childress and Davis, 
§5.6 [KF 4575 C48 (1986) ]. 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting 
judgement against the plaintiff, when there still were motions 
for Rule 11 sanctions against defense counsel (which alleged bad 
faith representation of material facts at issue before the court) 
still pending when the aforesaid judgement was granted to the 
defendants? 
The standard of review is the abuse of discretion and 
clearly erroneous standards. Standards of Review, by Childress 
and Davis, § 5.6 [KF 4575 C48 (1986)]. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
The following Utah Statutes and Rules are set-forth in the 
addendum to this brief in Appendix K. 
Statutes 
11 United States Code § 362 Automatic Stay 
Utah Annotated Code, § 16-10-13 Service of Process 
§ 31A-2-310 Service of Process 
§ 41-6-32 Notice of Accident 
§ 76-10-801 Nuisances 
§ 76-10-803 Public Nuisances 
§ 76-10-808 Civil Remedy Allowed1 
Rules 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 3 Commencing Action 
Rule 4 Service of Process 
Rule 8 Pleadings, general 
Rule 10 Pleadings, form of 
Rule 11 Pleadings, sanctions 
Rule 52 Findings by Court 
Rule 59 New Trials 
Rule 60 Relief from Judgement 
-3-
Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 201 Judicial Notice 
Rule 602 Personal Knowledge 
Rule 701 Lay Witness Testimony 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 29 Oral Arguments 
All citations in this brief hereinafter also make parallel 
reference to Utah Annotated Code § 78-38-1 with regards to 
statutory remedy to civil action for relief of damages as 
a result of nuisances under § 76-10-801, 76-10-803, or 
76-10-808, U.A.C. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff filed a claim for damages to his automobile in 
the Third Circuit Court stemming from a nighttime accident on 
the property of the defendants, and a claim for medical bills, 
pain and suffering stemming from aggravation of pre-existing 
medical conditions of the plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that 
the defendants placed an obstruction in the roadway, and failed 
to properly make the obstruction plainly visible at night when 
said obstruction was painted the same color of a background 
light pole and similarly dark-colored gas pumps (dark green). 
Plaintiff argued that said conduct constituted a nuisance and a 
public nuisance, that breached their legal duty to provide a 
safe passage to plaintiff and his passengers. Plaintiff further 
2 
alleged unlawful co-ercion and threat by defendants in order to 
prevent the plaintiff was exercising his rights under §76-10-808, 
Utah Annotated Code, which specified a civil action against a 
defendant who maintained a nuisance to recover damages. 
Course of Proceedings 
Appellant filed a complaint against the appellees on 
October 21, 1989 for damages resulting from an accident on or 
about March 26-27, 1989 in Provo, Utah County, Utah. Defendant 
Kemper Group was dismissed from the suit on April 4, 1990. 
Trial was scheduled for July 16, 1990, however, due to the 
appellants illness and incapacity, only defense counsel appeared. 
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Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial and a Notice of 
Appeal before July 29, 1990. On July 31, 1990, a judgement 
dismissing this action was signed by Third Circuit Court Judge 
Paul G. Grant. Appellants Motion for a new trial was denied 
on September 29, 1990. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, an 
automatic stay on further proceedings was issued by the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas, 
Dallas Division on behalf of defendant Southland Corporation. 
The stay was terminated by the Bankruptcy Court effective 
March 5, 1991, as affirmed by notice received from defense 
counsel on or about March 21, 1991. 
Disposition at Trial Court 
The trial court dismissed appellant's action with a finding 
of bad faith when the trial judge signed an order prepared by the 
defense counsel on July 31, 1990. 
The trial court dismissed appellantfs motion for a new trial 
on September 29, 1990 by a journal minute entry. 
Relevant Facts 
One of the central issues in this appeal involved an allega-
tion of misrepresentation, misconduct, or "fraud upon the court". 
Central facts related to this allegation is testimony by the 
defense counsel at trial that asserted that appellants malprac-
tice suit was dismissed (transcript: page 2, line 23-25). The 
trial date was July 16, 1990; the matter of Barron v. Dr. Thomas 
M. Kelley, MP, et al. was not dismissed until May 8, 1991, which 
was almost ten (10) months after the trial date. 
[Transcript in Appendix D; Barron v. Kelley et al is 
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located in Appendix B.] 
Other relevant facts will not be discussed here inasmuch 
as they offer interpretations and conclusions that are more 
correctly a part of the argument. 
Since the appellant does not seek a de novo review on the 
merits of the original cause of action, but only to set aside 
the judgement, detailed facts in this matter will only be 
offered as they are material to the issues on appeal. The claim 
was based on an automobile accident on appellee's of 
business on or about March 26-27, 1989, at approximately 12:30 
A.M. Appellant approached the pump island at an angle, and struck 
a black guard post that was approximately 23 inches from the gas 
pumps (and/or pump island). At the time of the accident, the 
aforesaid gas pumps were painted dark green, and the light pole 
beside the pumps was painted black. Appellants son was a witness 
and passenger at the time of the accident. 
1 
Appellants personal files and original papers are in storage 
in Salt Lake City, and the exact date in not known, but 
appellant believes the Motion for New Trial was filed on 
July 19, 1990; and the Notice of Appeal was filed on 
August 30, 1990 - within 30 days of the date the judgement 
was signed by Judge Grant. 
See Appendix C. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
On October 21, 1989, the appellant William Paul Barron, Jr. 
filed a complaint against the appellees alleging that the 
defendants were negligent in causing the accident by placing an 
unmarked, or poorly marked, obstruction in the roadway. The 
appellant contends that the coloring of the guard post was so 
indistinguisable from the background light post and gas pumps, 
and was, by virtue of its placement in the roadway, a nuisance 
to traffic. Appellant's claim for relief was based upon the 
provisions of § 76-10-808 of the Utah Annotated Code that 
provided civil remedy for relief on damages caused proximally 
from a nuisance. [See Appendix A.] 
Appellees have asserted that appellant failed to exercise 
a high degree of care and proper lookout, and maintained that 
appellants claim for relief was frivolous and without merit. 
[See letter from Dennis Opl, dated November 2, 1989, Appendix C.] 
Kemper Group of Insurance Companies was dismissed from the 
suit on April 4, 1990, because Utah law did not permit a direct 
action against the insurance carrier. 
Trial was first scheduled for hearing in January or there-
bout and was rescheduled to July 16, 1990, based upon objections 
raised by the appellant that discovery had not been completed. 
The trial court sustained appellant's Motion for Order to Compel 
Discovery shortly before this first scheduling of trial by the 
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defense counsel. 
Prior to the trial date the appellant filed two (2) motions 
for sanctions against the defense counsel pursuant to Rule 11 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The substance of the reasons 
for the appellants motion was the contention that the defense 
counsel had mispresented material facts, statements and allega-
tions of the complainant, or had made untrue assertions to the 
trial court knowing that they were not true. 
Prior to the trial date the appellant had provided a large 
body of medical information and records, and further kept the 
defense counsel abreast of the current medical condition of the 
appellant. Appellant reported to the defense counsel in the 
weeks prior to the trial alternate means of communication in an 
emergency because appellants telephone service was disconnected/ 
Appellant further advised defense counsel of recent medical 
treatment and episodes of cardiac syncopy and incapacity. The 
appellant made every effort to inform defense counsel of such 
circumstances that could delay his appearance (e.g. hospitali-
zation), because the appellant had every intention and desire to 
press his claim at trial. Appellant took such precautions as he 
deemed prudent because the appellant was experiencing health 
3 
problems immediately prior to the trial. 
On the day scheduled for trial the appellant became ill and 
incapacitated. Defense counsel asserted that the appellant had 
prosecuted this action in bad faith, and secured a judgement to 
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that effect on July 31, 1990. The appellant contends that at 
the trial defense counsel withheld knowledge of appellants 
medical condition as a possible explanation for non-appearance, 
and made several assertions to secure a finding of bad faith 
with full knowledge that those assertions were either completely 
false or misleading. On appeal appellant asserts that this 
misconduct, mispresentation or fraud only followed established 
conduct from onset of the action, and that defense counsel was 
fully culpable for said conduct. 
4 
Appellant further contends that the trial court knew that 
strong objections had been made against defense counsel's 
conduct, and that such conduct had a material bearing on the 
appellants case and the issue of appellees allegation of "bad 
faith" by the appellant. Armed with such knowledge, a judgement 
for bad faith was an abuse of discretion. 
Appellant filed a motion for a new trial within the ten (10) 
day requirement of Rule 59(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The motion was filed pursuant to Rule 59(a)(3) and 
asserted that appellants non-appearance was an accident or 
surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against 
due to appellants unforseen incapacitation on the day of trial. 
Appellant asserts that sufficient testimony of his incapa-
citation and medical evidence and other factors, such as loss of 
telepone service, existed to warrant a new trial. Further, in 
view of the motions for sanctions against alleged misconduct of 
the defense counsel, the denial of the motion by the trial court 
-9-
was an abuse of discretion. 
Because the appellant has relocated to Ohio, he does not 
seek a new trial. Appellants poverty prevents his return to 
Utah in the foreseeable future, therefore, he could not 
prosecute his claim even if the court found that a new trial 
was warranted. Appellant seeks only the equitable discharge 
from the judgement imposed by the trial court because of the 
misrepresentations, misconduct, or fraud of the defense counsel 
in securing that judgement. 
Because appellant's papers are in storage in Utah, he can 
not say with certainty, the date on which appellees' counsel 
first certified readiness for trial, but that it was in the 
early part of 1990 (i.e. January or February). 
2 
Notification to appellees' counsel in Appendix H. 
3 
See notification in Appendix H. 
4 
See documentation in Appendix I. 
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DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Appellees' counsel asserts that appellants suit was brought 
in bad faith [see trial transcript, page 2 line 2, Appendix D] 
and in the supporting memorandum for a motion for summary 
disposition dated June 24, 1991, and stated for the record: 
In the trial court, the appellant brought a claim 
of questionable merit which was unsubstantiated 
by fact. The trial court acknowledged the merit-
less nature of the claim by dismissing the claim 
with a finding that the suit was brought in bad 
faith. This appeal is a continuation of question-
able claims unsubstantiated by fact. [p. 4, lines 
19-25. ] 
The appellants suit and claim arose from an accident during 
the night of March 26-27, 1989, when the appellant struck a post 
approximately 23" from either the pump island or the the gas 
pump . The accident occurred in the city of Provo, Utah, at 
the corner of Columbia Aveune and 1200 West at approximately 
12:30 A.M. 
Upon impact, both the appellant and his son were appalled 
because appellants auto was almost two feet away from the gas 
pump. After exiting vehicle they determined that the object 
struck was a concrete-filled metal post about two feet from the 
gas pumps, and was unnoticeable at night because the post was 
painted black, and lacked any reflective coloring, striping or 
other visible markings on the roadway obstruction. Additionally, 
Visibility was made even more difficult due to background color-
ing. The gas pumps were painted dark green, and the light pole 
-11-
was painted black. 
Appellant pulled into the 7-11 Store refueling station off 
Columbia Avenue northbound, and approached the pump island at an 
angle of approximately forty-five degrees across the parking lot. 
Approaching the pump island, appellant turned his vehicle in 
order to place his vehicle parallel to the pumps. It was at this 
time that the guard post was struck. At this angle of approach, 
the guard post was in direct alignment with the light pole, which 
was also painted black, and partially centered on the line-of-
2 
sight with the nearest gas pump. Neither the appellant nor his 
primary witness, son Donald Eric Barron, observed any obstruc-
tion or danger in the vehicle's path of approach to the pumps 
prior to the impact with the guard post. 
After the collision, the appellant refueled and informed the 
clerk on duty of the accident, and requested reporting instruc-
tions, in accordance with the provisions of § 41-6-32, Utah 
Annotated Code (hereinafter cited as U.A.C.) Appellant also 
requested that the store manager be advised to place some type 
of reflective markings on the post in order to avoid any further 
mishaps. 
For the next six months appellant received no response to 
his claim for damages from Southland Corporation, which owns and 
operated the 7-11 Store in Provo, inspite of several letters and 
telephone calls. Finally, the appellant received a letter from 
Dennis Opl, insurance adjustor for Kemper Group, on November 2, 
1989 [See Appendix C.] Mr. Opl first asserted that my claim was 
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frivolous, and that if I pressed my claim for damages in court 
that they would demand a ruling of "bad faith". 
Prior to initiating legal proceedings, appellant sought the 
advice of legal counsel, concerning this matter and proceeded 
upon that advice to establish the claim in court. Because of 
appellant's poverty, legal advice was the extent of services 
obtained from John W. Call, Attorney-at-Law. Appellant went 
to the University of Utah Law Library to research applicable 
statutes and case law that might be pertinent to his case. [See 
Appendix A.] 
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Based upon legal advice thus far obtained, and research in 
law performed, appellant firmly believed that the three elements 
of a tort action in this matter were fulfilled. In reading 
§ 76-10-801, U.A.C. appellant learned that a nuisance was cited 
as "anything, item, manner, or condition whatsoever that is 
dangerous to human life or health", and that a public nuisance 
was cited in § 76-10-803, U.A.C. as "omitting to perform any 
duty, which ommission either annoys, injures, or endangers the 
comfort, repose, health or safety of three or more persons, or 
unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or 
renders dangerous for passage any ... street, highway, or in any 
way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use of 
property." These statutes outlined the existence of a legal 
duty from the defendants to the plaintiff. 
The appellant asserted that by placing an obstruction in 
the path of his vehicle, and failing to properly mark that 
obstruction, i.e. the guard post, in such a manner to make it 
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visible after sunset, at night, and particularly on a moonless 
night that was the case on March 26-27, 1989, that the defendants 
breached their legal duty to the appellant and his passengers, his 
son and daughter, and their friend. Further, the breach of that 
duty placed the appellant and his passengers "insecure in life or 
the use of property1", i.e. insecure in making a stop at a public 
place of business without injury or harm, and in which said 
negligence was the proximate cause of damage sustained to the 
appellants automobile. Therefore, all three elements of a tort 
claim against the tortfeasor, Southland Corporation dba 7-11 
Stores, and Citgo Petroleum Corporation, whose product for retail 
sales was marketed at that location and whose gasoline pumps and 
elemental attachments thereto, were met in the appellants claim. 
The only element missing is a proper claim for relief. Under 
§ 76-10-808, U.A.C. state statutes provided civil remedy for 
relief from damages as a proximate result of negligence for main-
taining a nuisance as described under the aforesaid statutes, 
§ 76-10-801 and 76-10-803, U.A.C. 
The appellant lacks formal legal training, but did graduate 
from Bowling Green State University maintaining a 3.850 grade 
point average in his major field of study. Appellant sought and 
obtained preliminary legal advice, and performed all relevant 
4 
research into law to the best of his ability and knowledge. 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter cited as 
U.R.C.P.), states: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes 
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a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, 
motion, or other paper; that to the best of his 
knowledge, information, and belief formed after 
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal 
of existing law, and that it is not interposed for 
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost 
of litigation. 
The appellant possesses the mental faculties to make a reason-
able inquiry and to perform basic legal research into his problem, 
after initial advice by an attorney at law, in order to formulate 
a good faith argument and belief upon filing his complaint with 
trial court. Even though the presentation may lack the polish of 
a seasoned attorney, and even though his pleadings may have had 
minor defects in form, appellant proceeded in this cause of action 
based upon a reasonable belief that there was a claim upon which 
relief was had under Utah law, and acted in every measure in good 
faith. 
Every pleading submitted to the trial court by the appellant 
was made in accordance with Rule 8(a), (e)(1) and (2), and (f), 
Rule 10, and Rule 11, U.R.C.P. Appellants complaint and pleadings 
were not very technical, perhaps, in that they they may have 
lacked numerous citations to case law that an attorney with time 
and expetise may have made; but every pleading was concise in that 
it gave fair notice of the nature, basis, or grounds of his claim. 
This was sufficient unless appellant would be entitled to no 
relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support 
of his claim. Blackman v. Snelqrove, 3 Utah 2d. 157, 280, 280 P.2d 
453 (1955). Further, the fundamental purpose of the liberalized 
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pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege of presenting 
whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their 
dispute, subject only to the reguirement that their adversaries 
have fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim 
and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. 
Williams v. State Farm Insurance Co., 656 P.2d 966 (Utah 1982). 
The second consideration on the guestion whether appellant 
brought forth a claim of guestionable merit would be determined 
- in normal proceedings - during the course of trial, wherein 
the testimony and evidence assembled by the appellant would be 
judged. 
During the course of discovery, appellees by and through 
their counsel, T. J. Tsakalos #3289, were provided with maps, 
diagrams, and photos prepared by the appellant of the accident 
site, during both daylight and nighttime hours. These items were 
prepared to show the appellants angle of approach to the obstruc-
tion, the distances and angles involved. The appellant also 
provided appelles with a computer enhancement photo rendition of 
what the appellant saw that night, by using color copier techno-
logy at Kinko's of Salt Lake City, Inc., to render a color photo 
taken several weeks after the accident (which was by then painted 
white instead of dark green) as it looked at the time of the 
accident, on the moonless night of March 26-27, 1989. This color 
copy photograph, which was enlarged, showed the position and the 
alignment of the guard post to the light pole and gas pump at the 
-16-
approach angle the appellant drove towards the obstruction on the 
night of the accident. In order to simulate a night photo, this 
copy was again copied with grey overtone and shading which aided 
appellant in showing how obscure the post would look at night 
when two posts of like color were aligned as they were when the 
5 
appellant made his approach. 
Therefore, appellant would contend that appellees1 averment 
that appellants claim had guestionable merit and was unsubstan-
tiated by fact to be wholly and totally false. Appellant would 
further contend that the trial court merely consented to the 
defense counsel averments because no specific findings of fact or 
law were made by the trial court on July 16, 1990fduring the 
proceedings absented by the appellant, either orally as shown in 
the trial transcript, or in the entry of judgement prepared by 
appellees by and through counsel, as reguired by Rule 41(b) and 
Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847 (U.C.A. 1989). 
Martindale v. Adams, 777 P.2d 514 (U.C.A. 1989). 
Appellants papers and files were placed in storage upon his 
departure from Utah in March 1991, due to loss of lease on 
his residence; therefore, appellant can not say with certainty 
whether this 23" measurement was from the gas pump to the post 
or from the concrete island to the pump. 
Another map, of approximate proportions, in order to illus-
trate is at Appendix F. Original papers in storage as above. 
See case law research and correspondence in Appendix A. 
See case law research and correspondence in Appendix A. 
See reconstructed drawing for approximation in Appendix F. 
Appellant's original papers in storage in Salt Lake City. 
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Questions For Review 
A discussion of each issue presented by the appellant on 
appeal will be discussed individualy. Only three issues that 
were originally described in the Docketing Statement will be dis-
cussed hereafter, as the other issues are now moot. The questions 
shown hereafter exhibit changes in syntax or additional words or 
phrases in order to give clearer meaning to the issues that the 
appellant is seeking review. [These changes appeared in bold face 
type in the appellant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities In 
Support of Appellant's Objections to Appellees Motion For Summary 
Disposition dated July 2, 1991.] 
1. In presenting pleadings and testimony to the trial 
court, did the defense counsel (T.J. Tsakalos #3289) 
commit "fraud upon the court", mispresentation, or 
misconduct in presenting evidence to justify defense 
assertions for a finding of "bad faith" by the trial 
court, or make material fact misrepresentations in 
the pleadings submitted or testified thereto in open 
court, or otherwise commit misconduct, to such a 
level or degree that justice would require relief to 
the plaintiff under Rule 60(b)(1), (3), and (7), of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, thereby rendering 
the judgement against the appellant invalid? 
On two separate occassions, in early January or February 
1990, and October 1, 1989, the appellant entered Objections and a 
Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11, U.R.C.P. (see record on 
Appeal) against defense counsel Mr. Tsakalos #3289 for alleged 
misconduct, misrepresentation, and/or fraud. 
The nature of these allegations was based upon appellants 
contention that counsel seriously misrepresented material facts 
or distorted plaintiff's assertions to the court. In particular, 
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defense counsel misrepresented the appellants claim, and the 
particulars of the accident, stating in various pleadings that 
"the plaintiff backed his cars into the gas pumps", or "Mr. 
Barron was driving his car and ran into our pumps and sued us." 
(See transcript, page 2, line 16-17, Appendix D). In another 
pleading, Mr. Tsakalos certified to the trial court, approximately 
2 January 1990, that the action was ready for trial. Discovery had 
not been completed, and several items and motions were still out-
standing. At one point, appellant had to compell appellees counsel 
to provide discovery material by motion, which was favorably ruled 
upon by the trial court. 
3 
Mr. Tsakalos stated in the Memorandum (page 6, line 13-14), 
that "Neither does the statement that the appellant ran into the 
pumps rather that ran into a protective barrier situated next to 
the pumps constitutes fraud upon the court." The material facts 
in this case depend upon an exact set of circumstances, because in 
no other would the appellant have a claim upon which relief could 
be granted. Appellees have set forth a conclusion, then turned the 
facts to match that conclusion, even if it meant distorting or 
misrepresenting the claims and allegations made by the plaintiff. 
However the most serious breach of misconduct occurred on the 
date set for trial on July 16, 1990. Appellees counsel made cer-
tain allegations and incorporated them as the basis for his motion 
to dismiss and for a finding of "bad faith" against the appellant. 
4 
In the Memorandum Mr. Tsakalos stated that he "did not 
intentionally misrepresent any facts pertaining to appellants1 
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other litigation." (Line 12-13, page 6). 
The trial transcript records Mr. Tsakalos remarks as follows: 
I also brought a claim for bad faith in this, your 
honor. Just for the record, in October of '89, he 
brought a malpractise suit on his own against a 
doctor in LDS Hospital and IHC, and that has been 
dismissed. On June 26, '89 he sued Charter-Summit 
Hospital and several people and that -- pro se, and 
that has been dismissed. On June 25, f89, he sued 
Midvale City and Midvale P.D. and that was dismissed. 
On October 31 of '89, he sued the State of 
California and the California Department of Food and 
Agriculture, 'cuase they stopped him at the border, 
wouldn't allow him to bring in fruit and vegatables. 
That was dismissed in the United States District 
Court. On November 29, '89, he re-filed that suit 
again and that has been dismissed. November 16, f89, 
he sued the State of Utah and the Utah State Tax 
Commission for his taxes. I think that one has been 
dismissed, and then he sued us when our pumps did 
not get out of his way,and now has not appeared. 
[See Appendix D, page 2, line 23, through page 3, 
line 13. ] 
At issue is whether defense counsel's representations to the trial 
court constituted misconduct, misrepresentations or fraud upon the 
5 
court. Mr. Tsakalos contends in the Memorandum that he "had no 
duty to elaborate further". He has made an issue of the fact that 
the appellant is appearing pro se, with the implication that that 
fact lessens the appellant's credibility; and that the appellant 
was found to be in "bad faith" "in part due to numerous other 
suits brought by the appellant at approximately the same time." 
(See Memorandum page 2, line 4-6). Since he has characterized 
appellants other actions as frivolous and without merit, their 
true character and nature are material facts to that assertion 
to the trial court; and are reviewable under the Material Fact 
and Clearly Erroneous Doctrine as to their veracity. 
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In the course of discovery, the appellant provided defense 
7 
counsel with a list of other cases, and as his testimony demon-
strates he was familiar with those cases. In most normal cir-
cumstances, as he asserted, he may not have been under any obli-
gation to explain in detail the status of other litigation by 
the appellant. However, the canon of ethics would require that 
he provide the trial court with sufficient detail to justify his 
conclusions, especially since he is using the weight of this 
evidence to show "bad faith" on the part of the appellant, and 
because the trial court is relying on this testimony to make a 
finding of "bad faith". It would follow then that whether these 
allegations are truthful or not, or whether their characteriza-
tion is truthful or not, would have great bearing on the court's 
decision. 
The first case cited by Mr. Tsakalos consisted to total and 
utter fabrication. He represented to the trial court that the 
matter of Barron v. Dr. Kelly, MP, et al, 890906515-CV, 3d DC, 
was dismissed as of trial date on July 16, 1990. In fact this 
case was not dismissed without prejudice until May 8, 1991; which 
is almost ten months later than defense counsels assertion. He 
is fully culpable for this falsehood made to the trial court. If 
he knew of the case, he should -- know the status, or could have 
ascertained it. [See Appendix B.] 
The other assertions by Mr. Tsakalos consisted of a number of 
misrepresentations and distortions. He averred that in the matter 
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of Barron v. Charter-Summit Hosptial et al, 890903923-CV, 3d DC, 
was dismissed on July 31, 1989 pursuant to an agreement and 
settlement of all issues acceptable to the parties and a request 
for voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1), U.R.C.P. This does 
not follow appellees characterization of "bad faith". [Appendix G] 
In the matter of Barron v. The City of Midvale Utah et al, 
890903924-CV, 3d DC, a stipulation and motion for voluntary 
dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1), U.R.C.P. was signed January 18, 
1990, said action having been fully compromised to the satisfaction 
of all parties. Again, the facts of this case do not follow the 
appellee's characterization of "bad faith". [See Appendix G.] 
In the matter of Barron v. The State of California et al, 
89-C-983-G and 89-C-1056-S, DC of Utah, a number of mispresenta-
tions and falsehoods occur. Mr. Tsakalos averred that the nature 
of this claim was a suit "'cause they stopped him at the border, 
wouldn't allow him to bring in fruit and vegetables". The case 
was docketed under the heading "CONSPIRACY AGAINST CITIZENS 
RIGHTS", and was characterized as a civil rights action for illegal 
search and seizure. Appellees characterized this suit as a frivo-
lous matter over fruits and vegetables in order to affirm their 
contention of "bad faith." However, in the Memorandum Decision 
and Order dismissing the action on August 15, 1990, by Judge 
Greene of the United States District Court, District of Utah, 
Central Division, the court held that the appellant acted with 
"sincerity and earnestness" (See Order, page 2, line 17, Appendix 
G). Further, Mr. Tsakalos characterized this case as two separate 
filings; one which was filed on October 31, 1989, and promptly 
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dismissed and then re-filed again on November 29, 1989. The true 
facts in this matter are that the Clerk of Court inadvertently 
filed a second copy as an original action. This was corrected by 
an Order of Consolidation, which was entered on January 19, 1990. 
[See Order of Consolidation, Appendix G.] This situation is 
similar to this appeal when the Clerk of Court entered this appeal 
a second time, when the automatic stay imposed by the U.S. Bank-
rputcy Court in Dallas under 11 U.S.C. § 362 was lifted on March 5, 
1991. The original appeal, which was first filed on August 30, 
1990, and the "second" appeal were consolidated. Even in this 
case, Mr. Tsakalos misrepresented the facts to support a conclusion 
that could not be sustained by those facts. 
In the matter of Barron v. The State of Utah, and the Utah Tax 
Commission, CA 90-4092, 10th Cir., was presented with some doubt as 
to it's status. This was the only case which was properly noted by 
the appellee's counsel. This suit involved issues concerning state 
taxation of federal retiree's compensation which were raised in the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Davis v. Miciqan. 
This case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the U.S. 
District Court after the trial date, and affirmed by the 10th 
Circuit Court of Appeals on February 29, 1991. The mispresenta-
tion by appellee's counsel, however, was to characterize this case 
also as one base in frivolity and wholly without merit. In fact 
the case presented by the appellant was patterned after a similar 
case in the state courts, and was an extention of the Supreme 
Court's Davis v. Michigan decision to the situation in Utah. 
[See Appendix G. ] 
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In the course of discovery, appellee's counsel requested, 
and was provided with detailed medical records and information on 
the appellant's medical history and condition. He specifically 
requested information on how the appellant was disabled, or inca-
pacitated by his condition. 
Additionally, counsel for the appellees was advised in June 
1990, that the appellant had been ill during the past month (i.e. 
from approximately May 1, 1990 to June 1, 1990), and had been 
incapacitated with cardiac syncopy. He was also advised that the 
appellant no longer had telephone service; and that should any 
situation arise where contact with the appellant was necessary, 
then appellee's counsel was advised to make contact through the 
appellants apartment manager. 
It can be argued that the adversary counsel is not obligated 
to perform the complaintant's duties; however, the canon of ethics 
require one to advise the court fully of all material facts. Then 
o 
counsel may argue his interpretation of those facts. 
For the record, the appellant also advised the court of this 
change in circumstance. In rendering any decision against the 
appellant, the trial court must weigh all facts before it, and 
to do otherwise is an abuse of discretion. Certaintly the trial 
court may take judicial notice of two unresolved motions for 
sanctions made by the appellant, and suporting documentation which 
included reference to the appellant's health status and poverty, 
and particularly specific notations in correspondence and courtesy 
copies of materials sent to the trial judge pursuant to Rule 201 
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of the Utah Rules of Evidence (hereinafter cited as U.R.E.) [See 
Appendix I.] Warren v. Robinson, 21 Utah 429, 61 P.28 (1900). 
State v. Bates, 22 Utah 65, 61 P. 905, 83 Am. St. R. 768 (1900). 
Utah Power & Light Co. v. Richmond Irrigation Co., 80 Utah 105, 
13 P.2d 320 (1932). In interest of J , 576 P.2d 1280 (Utah 
1978). Robison v. Kelly, 69 Utah 376, 255 P. 30 (1927). Spencer 
v. Industrial Commission, 81 Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618 (1933). 
Defense counsel has asserted that this cause of action and 
appeal was questionable in merit, and alluded that all previous 
cases filed at approximately the same time period (i.e. the latter 
half of 1989) were all similarly without merit or frivolous. The 
appellant has herein demonstrated that Mr. Tsakalos made averments 
under oath in open court - knowlingly and with malicious intent -
that were total falsehoods, or so distorted as to make a false 
characterization of the true facts. Appellee's counsel did not 
make truthful and complete averments, then offer an interpretation 
of those facts to the trial court. Rather, facts were abused into 
unrecognizable forms in order to fit the characterization of the 
appellant throughout the course of these proceedings. Those 
characterizations included the bias against appellant for acting 
pro se, and a buffoon who ran into a well-marked structure that he 
should have been familar with, and a rascallion who sought a deep-
pockets suit out of poverty. 
Appellant would contend that these positions are contrary to 
the material facts in this case and established law. Both federal 
and state law provide for access to impecunious litigants to the 
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courts. In accordance with the principles of equity and justice 
under English Common Law, the courts have extend poor litigants 
proeeding on their own more latitude in presenting their claims 
in order to place them in an equal footing before the court as 
attorneys at law. During the first half of the nineteenth 
century the courts drew heavily upon the Federalist Papers and 
other writings of our founding fathers in order to embody other 
principles pecular to the American experience, and added those 
principles to the common law, which appellant would refer to as 
American common law. Although not formally recognized, or for-
mally stated as such, these principles today are generally 
recognized as cliches, such as: We the people, government of 
-by - and for the people, due process, equal justice before the 
law, no man is above the law, a nation of law not of man, etc. 
In the spirit of this law, the allowance for the vacation 
of a judgement is a creature of equity. It is designed to relieve 
a party from the harshness of enforcing a judgement resulting from 
such causes as: the wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes 
preventing the presentation of a claim or a defense. 
Appellant is asserting a claim for relief from the judgement 
under Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. which states in part: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgement, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; >.. (3) fraud 
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), mispresentation or other misconduct 
of an adverse party; ... (7) or any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of 
-26-
the judgement. 
Appellant contends that under the provisions Of Rule 60(b)(1), 
U.R.C.P./ inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect would be 
constituted by the facts surrounding appellants absence from 
the trial. Appellant had begun to suffer cardiac syncopy and 
periods of incapacity [See Appendix J], and had so informed the 
other parties to this case [See Appendix H]. Appellant was also 
without phone service in the weeks just prior to tfte trial date, 
and had so informed the other parties to this case/ and had made 
arrangement for supplementary contact procedure in the event of 
emergency or necessity [See Appendix H]. Illness alone is not a 
sufficient excuse to make neglect a ground for vacating the 
judgement. Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416. 260 P.2d 741 
(1953). However, appellant would argue that illness, incapacity 
as demonstrated by medical history, lack of means and time to 
make proper notice on the date of trial, and prior notice of such 
conditons that could create a problem and a proferred arrangement 
for emergency contact, do present sufficient cause to extend the 
provisions of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect 
to this situation. Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). 
Appellant contends that under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(3), 
U.R.C.Pw the misrepresentation or misconduct by opposing counsel 
in presenting under oath in open court testimony tftat has been 
shown to be total fabrication or false or misleading would consti-
tute grounds for vacating the judgement. If the court would find 
that these actions by opposing counsel constituted "fraud upon the 
court11, relief from the judgement would normally proceed by means 
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of an independent action against opposing counsel, Mr. Tsakalos. 
Shaw v. Pilcher, 9 Utah 2d. 222, 341 P.2d 949 (1959). Despain v. 
Despain, 682 P.2d 849 (Utah 1984). Because appellant has removed 
from the state of Utah, is disabled for multiple causes, and is 
still impecunious, appellant would not be able to seek relief under 
this gravamen in Utah courts; therefore, appellant would argue for 
reversal of previous precedent for "fraud upon the court" in the 
particular situation of the appellant, barring of course, a favor-
able finding under misconduct or misrepresentation provisions of 
the rule. 
Appellant contends that under the provisions of Rule 60(b)(7), 
U.R.C.P. other reasons for relief include abuse of discretion by 
the trial court in granting judgement. Any evidence which had a 
bearing on the assertions made by opposing counsel is a matter of 
material fact subject to review on the same standards. First Jersey 
National Bank v. Dome Petroleum Ltd., 726 F.2d 335, 338 (3rd Cir. 
1983). These assertions were made known to the trial court via 
appellants motions for sanctions under Rule 11, U.R.C.P., and 
other documents and pleadings forwarded to the trial court in the 
course of these proceedings. Opposing counsel erred on the side 
of ethical misconduct by withholding material facts from the court 
in both oral testimony and written pleadings. The trial court 
erred in not considering the issues raised by the appellant prior 
to granting a judgement in favor of the appellees for appellants 
alleged "bad faith". This is especially the case when all pre-
vious pleadings and motions by the appellant exhibited an aggres-
sive desire to prosecute his claim before the court. 
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In consideration of all the facts and circumstances, it is 
appropriate to review granting of the judgement under the abuse 
of discretion doctrine, and to set aside the judgement under one 
on several causes. Appellant took timely action to seek relief 
from the judgement by both filing a motion for new trial, and 
appeal from the judgement. Relief is warranted because of the 
harshness of enforcing the judgement because of opposing 
counsel's misconduct, mispresentation or fraud, and the misfor-
tunes that prevented the presentation of the appellants claim. 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co. et al, 260 P.2d 741, 123 Utah 416 
(1953). Kettner v. Snow, 13 Utah 2d. 382, 375 P.2d 28 (1962). 
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52 (Utah 1984). Schindler v. 




Appellant removed from Utah in March 1991, and most of the 
papers and files were placed in storage. At this time, the 
appellant can not say with authority which pleadings were 
involved, but the two Motions for Sanctions should have the 
particulars, and be found in the Record on Appeal. 
Exact date unknown as appellant does not have access to all 
papers. Personal files are in storage, and appellant can n 
view the record on appeal because he currently resides in 
Ohio. 
Memorandum cited is appellees' Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Appellees* Motion for Summary 
Disposition dated June 24, 1991. 
Ibid., page 6, lines 11-13. 
Ibid., page 6, line 11. 
Ibid. 
This list was not a comprehensive listing of cases, rather 
was just a list of case titles and courts of juridiction, a 
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far as I know, or recollect. 
Appellant does not offer any case law or other authority 
because appellant is not able to undertake legal research 
at this time, because he is not able to quickly or conven-
iently locate and drive to a law library with adequate 
resources appropriate to Utah law. This argument is made 
in accordance with standard ethical considerations. 
Case citation: Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co. et al, 260 P.2d 
741, 123 Utah 416 (1953). 
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Questions for Review, Part II 
2. Did Appellant provide sufficient evidence for the 
trial court upon his motion for a new trial to 
show merit due circumstances provided for under 
Rule 59(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? And 
did the trial court abuse its' discretion in 
denying the appellant's motion for a new trial? 
Appellant was not able to be present because he was ill and 
incapacitated from an episode of cardiac syncopy [See Appendix J] 
on the date scheduled for trial. Appellant filed a Motion for a 
New Trial pursuant to the provisions of Rule 59(a)(3), U.R.CP. 
on July 19, 1991, and hand-carried the same to the court. Upon 
advice of legal counsel, John W. Call, appellant further filed an 
appeal of the judgement on or about August 30, 1990. This action 
was not necessary, but unknown to the appellant, because a timely 
motion under Rule 59 terminates the running of the time for appeal 
of a judgement, and does not begin to run again until the order 
granting or denying such a motion is entered. Hume v. Small Claims 
Court of Murray City, Utah, 590 P.2d 309 (Utah 1979). Appellant's 
motion for a new trial was denied on September 29, 1990. The 
appeal did not go forward at that time because the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for Dallas, Texas, issued an automatic stay on 
further proceedings against the appellees pursuant to 11 U.S.C 
§ 362, dated October 24, 1990. 
The granting of a new trial should never be merely capricious 
and arbitrary; but should be ordered only when sound judicial 
discretion, in the interest of doing justice between the parties, 
so requires. A decision of the trial court in this matter is a 
matter for review on the theory of abuse of discretion on appeal, 
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when appellant has made a showing of at least one of the circum-
stances specified in subdivision (a) of the rule. Crellin v. Thomas, 
247 P. 2d 264 (Utah 1952), and Uptown Appliance & Radio Co. v. 
Flint, 122 Utah 298, 249 P.2d 826 (1952); Thorley v. Kolob Fish & 
Game Club, 13 Utah 2d 294, 373 P.2d 574 (1962); Smith v. Shreeve, 
551 P.2d 1261 (Utah 1976); Moon Lake Ele. Assn. v. Ultrasystems W. 
Constructors, Inc., 765 P.2d 125 (Utah C.A. 1988); Schindler v. 
Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah C.A. 1989). 
In the appellants motion, he argued that it was not illness 
alone that caused accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against, and that his motion had merit 
under law in the interest of doing justice between the parties. 
Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953). 
Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 P.2d 264 (1952). 
Appellant cited prior illness, and incapacitation as attested 
to by his apartment manager, Puyol Bang. This is the same party 
to whom appellant refered when a notice was given to opposing 
counsel in June 1990 [See Appendix E]. In addition, a statement 
from appellants physician, previously provided to opposing counsel 
in response to his discovery request corroborated the contentions 
of appellant of incapacitation, although the physician would make 
no specific averments [See Appendix J]. 
Appellant suffered from a chronic, debilitating condition and 
did not seek treatment after his recovery on July 16, 1990. His 
affidavit and averments of the circumstances are creditable under 
Rule 602 and 701, U.R.E. barring objections for cause by appellees. 
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To the best knowledge of the appellant, and his recollections of 
the proceedings, the appellees made no objections to the court 
which were deemed creditable, because the trial court denied the 
appellees Motion to Quash/Strike the appellants motion for a new 
trial. That is, appellant believes, to his best knowledge, that 
appellees Motion to Strike did not raise objections to either the 
sufficiency of evidence to support appellants motion or show the 
impeachability of supporting testimony of Dr. Lowry and Puyol Bang. 
Appellant contends that his illness, incapacity stemming from 
that illness as demonstrated by medical hstory and testimony of 
appellant's physician, the lack of means to make notice to the 
appellees and court of incapacity on the date of trial because 
telephone service had been disconnected, and prior notices given 
to the court and opposing counsel [See Appendix H] of potential 
problems resulting from appellants disability and offering a 
solution and point of contact through Puyol and Melanie Bang, all 
mitigate for a finding of surprise, inadvertence or excusable 
neglect. [See also Appendix E and J]. 
Even though defense counsel asserts that Rule 59(a)(3), 
U.R.C.P. is usually construed as requiring accident or surprise 
at trial, appellant would contend that the principle is equally 
valid when applied to the situation under appeal where the matter 
of appellant's non appearance is caused by accident or surprise. 
Further, under Rule 201, U.R.E. judicial notice should have 
been made of previous pleadings (i.e. motions for sanctions), and 
other papers alluding to misconduct by opposing counsel, and for 
the sake of justice and equity considering the past aggressiveness 
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and apparent desire to prosecute appellants claim, taking all 
facts into consideration it was an abuse of discretion for the 
trial court not to grant a new trial under the circumstances to 
the appellant. 
Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P. states in part: 
In all actions tried upon the facts without a 
jury or with and advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately 
its conclusions of law thereon, ... The trial 
court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, 
except as provided in Rule 41(b). The court 
shall, however, issue a brief written statement 
of the grounds for its decisions on all motions 
granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, 
and 59 when the motion is based on more than 
one ground. 
No written findings were made, and only an journal minute 
entry of oral decision to deny appellant!s motion for a new trial 
was ever received. The rule and case law require that the facts 
be stated specially and conclusions of law be entered separately. 
Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847 (Utah C.A. 1989); Martindale v. Adams, 
777 P.2d 514 (Utah C.A. 1989). 
Because appellant is unable to prosecute the original claim 
against the appellees at the present time for reasons of poverty, 
distance from Utah, and disability, appellant seeks a finding on 
this issue in the event that circumstances should change in the 
near future, and for precedential value. 
Copy of note made is not dated, therefore, appellant can 
not state with certainty when sent, except a notice that 
dicovery documents were sent to opposing counsel was filed 
with the Clerk of Courts as required under the rules. 
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Questions for Review: Part III 
3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by 
granting a judgement to the appellees when 
two motions for sanctions against the appellees' 
counsel under Rule 11, U.R.C.P. were still 
pending and unresolved at the time of the trial? 
Contrary to the assertions of opposing counsel, the grounds 
that were cited by appellant as material and germane to this 
appeal formed the core of the same argument for the imposition of 
sanctions against appellees' counsel, Mr. T. J. Tsakalos #3289. 
The principle argument for sanctions was the deliberate misrepre-
sentation of facts and other distortions that appellant alleged 
were made in bad faith and interposed for improper purpose, such 
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation. Whether specific conduct amounts to a 
violation of this rule is a question of law for the trial court to 
render a decision thereon. Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 
163 (Utah C.A. 1989). To avoid, slight, or ignore appellants most 
serious concerns is an abuse of discretion. 
This assertion is even more apparent when viewed with the 
consideration that the judgement rendered in favor of the appellees 
was wholly reached on a finding of "bad faith" on the part of the 
appellant under the same rule. Appellant would contend that under 
Rule 201, U.R.E. judicial notice should have been made of allega-
tions by appellant of "bad faith" by the opposing counsel, and 
therefore, should have been addressed and resolved prior to any 
finding against appellant, and judgement entered therefrom. 
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It is simply inappropriate, and unjust to the appellant, to 
merely presume that his allegations or concerns lack credibility 
simply because he lacks formal legal training, or acts in the 
matter before the court pro se because his poverty prevents the 
hire of an attorney. It is equally inappropriate, and unjust to 
the appellant, to presume greater credibility to opposing counsel 
merely because he is an attorney at law. Federal and state law 
provide that impecunious litigants shall have equal access to the 
courts. Appellant contends that equal access is effectively denied 
when the trial court imposes an onus or bias against poor litigants, 
2 
or those that proceed pro se. Precisely because such persons lack 
formal legal training, greater latitude is and should be granted to 
harmless errors committed by such persons; the same latitude is not 
appropriate to attorneys whose training and experience lend them-
selves to presentation of appellees defenses. 
In the motions for sanctions, and other pleadings before the 
court, the appellant complained of several actions by opposing 
counsel which appellant held to be improper, harassing, and 
intended solely to increase costs of litigation. Two examples are 
offered. When appellant initiated litigations against the 
appellees, service of summons required three separate requirements. 
The title of the case was captioned as required under Rule 3(a) and 
Rule 8(f), U.R.C.P. in order to give fair notice of the nature and 
basis for the litigations, and the type of litigation, to all the 
defendants being brought into the cause of action; variance between 
-36-
title of the summons and the title of the complaint was not 
required in order to show separate requirements under the Rules 
and statutes for personal service. Bawden & Associates v. Smith, 
624 P.2d 676 (Utah 1981); Blackham v. Snelqrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 
280 P.2d 453 (1955). Appellant made personal service on two 
defendants, Southland Corportation and 7-11 Stores, under the 
provisions of Rule 4(d), U.R.C.P. Separate service was required 
by statute under different circumstances. Personal service upon 
the state insurance commissioner pursuant to § 31A-2-310, U.A.C. 
was required for defendant Kemper Group; and personal service 
upon the director of business regulations pursuant to § 16-10-13, 
U.A.C. was required for defendant Citgo Petroleum Corporation. 
Opposing counsel prematurely filed a Motion to Quash service of 
process, and further cited within the motion appellants failure 
to comply with a statute that did not exist: §41A-2-3. Appellant 
failed to comprehend that counsel had miscited § 31A-2-310, and 
because counsel was an attorney, presumed he complained of some 
requirement that appellants legal research may have overlooked. 
Both actions, required additional time at the University of Utah 
Law Library in order to ascertain what failure of appellant was 
complained, and the filing of additonal pleadings in the form of 
objections, and a motion for a more definate statement. 
Secondly, discovery as required under the appellantfs motion 
to compel discovery affirmed by the trial court had not been 
completed, and certain motions, including the appellant's motions 
for sanctions under Rule 11, were still pending before the court, 
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when appellees' counsel certified to the trial court readiness for 
trial. Rule 11, U.R.C.P. assert that Mr. Tsakalos' signature on 
this pleading consistuted by him that he had read the pleading and 
that is was correct. Counsel knew that the aforesaid items were 
deficient, and that the case was not ready for trial at that time 
when he signed the certification to that effect. 
Appellant contends that these facts support a finding that the 
trail court abused its discretion by not ruling on the Motion for 
Sanctions under Rule 11 prior to granting a judgement to the 
appellees against the appellant for reasons of "bad faith", when 
"bad faith" constituted the same grounds for relief as claimed in 
appellant's motion. 
In a previous matter before Judge Grant, the appellant was 
the defendant in Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Barron, 
870901165-CV, and in this case had also sought the advice 
of legal counsel, John W. Call, prior to asserting his 
defense in the matter acting pro se. Upon legal advice, the 
appellant argued on the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, 
and offered in testimony and evidence those items suggested 
by the appellant's counsel. Without any foundation for the 
remark, Judge Grant after ruling against appellant told the 
appellant that he should seek legal counsel to defend an 
action in court. In the appellant's mind, and opinion 
formed that Judge Grant did not rule as he did based on the 
sufficiency of the argument or evidence, but because of a 
bias against the appellant solely because he acted due to 
his poverty pro se in defending the action, and was opposed 
by an attorney at law. [The presumption seemed an extention 
of legal principle in Larrabee v. Turner, where a police 
officer's testimony has greater credibility that the citizen, 
to the credibility of an attorney at law vs. a lay citizen* 
which was cited by the Utah Court of Appeals in the matter of 




Appellant contends that the issues before the court are 
matters of substance and merit directly related to the public's 
perception of justice and fair play. If a practicing attorney 
at law can deliberately misrepresent and distort material facts, 
utter total falsehoods (as was the case with appellees' counsel 
assertions in the matter of Barron v. Dr. Thomas M. Kelly, H.D. 
et al.), or represent circumstances in a manner inconsistent 
with acceptable ethics, and escape penalty or censure, then 
justice and equity are not served. 
Appellant contends that relief from the judgement imposed by 
the trial court should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1),(3), 
and (7), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, because substantial 
justice to the appellant demands such a course. 
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting the 
judgement to the appellees, erred in not ruling on the appellant's 
Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 11 against defense counsel, erred 
in not granting appellant a new trial. Appellant requests a 
favorable affirmation of these contentions. 
Appellant also seeks a favorable affirmation of the points of 
law brought in issue and support of the findings above, specif-
ically, that appellant as an impecunious litigant acting pro se 
- and others so situated - are entitled to substantial access to 
justice in state courts with an equal footing with lawyers, and 
due sufficient latitude that would entitle relief under any state 
of facts which could be proved in support of a claim without the 
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burden of exceptional forms or other requirements that could be 
expected of lawyers, as long as they can be construed to do 
substantial justice under Rule 8(f), of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Secondly, that illness with other mitigating circum-
stances is sufficient to extend or afford the protections of 
Rule 59(a) and Rule 60(b), of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
to the appellant. Further, that the preponderous of evidence, or 
evidence which would demonstrate to a reasonable person that one 
of the conditions of Rule 60(b), U.R.C.P. had been met, is 
sufficient for favorable affirmation of a motion made by the 
appellant under Rule 60. Additionally, appellant seeks affirma-
tion that the common law of the land includes principles and 
ideas that are unique to the American experience, and embodied in 
extention of English Common Law, which should be known as American 
common law. And finally, appellant seeks an affirmation that the 
appellant acted in good faith on what his belief was formed after 
reasonable inquiry that the action was well grounded in fact and 
warranted by existing law, or good faith argument for extention, 
modification or reversal of existing law. 
DATED this Z ^ th day of ^yJb~y 1991. 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JRjf 
-40-
MOTION FOR JUDGEMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
Pursuant to Rule 29(a)(3), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, appellant in this matter requests that oral argu-
ments in this matter be waived after briefing is completed by 
all parties. 
Appellant currently resides with family in the State of 
Ohio. Appellant suffers from multiple disabilities, and has 
only a federal disability annuity of $477 per month to live 
upon, and for the appellant to return to the State of Utah for 
oral arguments in this matter would create a severe hardship. 
Therefore, appellant respectfully requests that this 
matter be decided upon arguments contained in the parties 
briefs and the record on appeal. 
Dated this 26th day of July, 1991. 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, J&'. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
William P. Barron, Jr. 
Acting as Attorney Pro Se 
11475 Holiday Way 
Hillsboro OH 45133-9368 
[513] 393-3925 or 372-2744 
1/ William Paul Barron, Jr., certify that on the 37 th 
day of \xjJt'y/y / 1991, that I served a copy of the attached 
Brief of M:he Appellant upon T. J. Tsakalos, Esq., the counsel for 
the appellees in this matter, by mailing it to him by first class 
mail with sufficient postage prepaid tot he following address: 
T. J. Tsakalos #3289 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
4 Triad Center, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City UT 84110-2970 
( 8 0 1 ) 3 6 3 - 7 6 1 1 
W/jLt 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, ,krR. 
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PI^E-LITIGATION LEGAL RESEARCH 
APPENDIX A 
STATfcMEMT OF CASE SPtftKY 
1. MATERIAL FACTS: 
Accident occurred in Provo Utah at 7-11 Store at 1200 West and Columbia 
Avenue on night of March 26-27, 1989 at 1230 AM [0030 Hours]. Projection in 
the roadway 23" from pump (no other station situated in like manner in either 
Utah or Colorado, which have the post on the pump island, not the roadway). 
Son, Donald Hopkins in front seat and a witness. He did not see post either 
as it was obscured late at night, poor lighting, same color as background. 
[See letter to John W. Call, Attomey-at-Law, dated Sep. 2, 1990, follows.] 
2. CLAIM FOR RELIEF: 
Tort Action based upon Joseph v. Hustad Corporation, 454 P.2d 916-918 
A. Existence of a Legal Duty: 
§ 76-10-801 and 76-10-803 proscribe that nuisances which renders 
a highway or street unsafe for passage for 3 or more people [I, Donny, Jessica 
and Tanya in car], or insecure in life or use of property is prohibited. 
B. Breach of Duty—Negligence: 
Post 23" from pumps in highway. Post painted black, background 
indued black lightpole in line-of-sight from plaintiff's approach and dark-
green colored pumps, no reflectorization, poor lighting. 
Co-ercion, threat: 
Dennis Opl characterized plaintiff's claim as frivolous, and would 
seek "bad faith" award of attorney fees per § 78-27-56 U.A.C. Would not 
respond to claim made on March 29, 1989 until September-1989. [See letters 
dated Nov. 2, 1989 and Nov. 4, 1989 by plaintiff, follows.] 
C. Damages as a Proximate Result: 
Damages due to automobile accident. Mental Pain and Anguish due 
to stress and resulting effects on health. 
3. AUTHORITY FOR RELIEF: 
§ 76-10-808 U.A.C. allowed civil action against defendant who maintained 
a nuisance to recover damages. 
APPENDIX A 
PRE-LITIGATION LEGAL RESEARCH 
1. TORT - 3 elements 
A, Existence of legal duty from defendant to plaintiff 
B. Breach of duty 
3. Damage as a proximate result 
Joseph v. Hustad Corp., 454 P.2d 916-918 
either: - direct invasion of some legal right 
- infraction of some public duty by which special damages occurs 
- violation of some private obligation by which like damages occurs 
Tortfeasor- wrongdoer 
liability, negligence 
Palsgraph doctrine - one who is negligent is liable only for the harm or 
injury which is within the orbit of foreseability and not for every injury 
which follows from his negligence. N/A under Utah law per John Call, Attorney. 
2. STATUTES, UTAH ANNOTATED CODE 
§ 41-6-32 Upon collision with other property, give notice to owner. 
§ 41-6-114 Injurious materials (trash) on highways. [N/A] 
§ 76-10-801 Nuisannce (1) .. anything, item, manner, condition whatsoever 
that is dangerous to human life or health 
§ 76-10-803 Public nusiance (1) omitting to perform any duty, which 
ommission either annoys, injuries, or endangers the 
comfort, repose, health or safty of three or more persons, or 
unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tend to obstruct, 
or renders dangerous for passage any .. street, highway, or 
in any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or 
the use of property. 
§ 76-10-808 Civil remedy for relief. 
§ 31A-3-105 Presumption of jurisdiction (1) any insurer which provides 
coverage of a business activity conducted in this state is 
subject to the juris of the Insurance Commissioner and the 
courts under 31A-2-309 and 31A-2-310. 
§ 31A-2-310 Summons issued by Insurance Conmissioner. 
§ 16-10-13 Service of process to registered agent, Division Director 
Dept. of Business Regulation as agents for receipt of 
service (2) whenever a corporation fails to appoint or main-
tain a Registered agent, Director, Division of Corp. Com. 
Code is the agent upon whan any process, notice or demand may 
be served (two copies) [See also § 16-10-111(2) for service 
of process on foreign copp. (i.e. out-of-state). 
§ 16-10-111 Service as above. 
§ 16-10-125 Sets fees for above @ $10.00 
Insurance Commissioner: Harold Yancey, 160 E. 300 S., SLC 
Director: Peter Van Alystne, 160 E. 300 S., SLC 
§ 78-27-56 In civil actions ... the court may award reasonable .. fees 
.. if the court determines that the action or defense to the 
action was without merit and not broughtor asserted in good 
faith. 
APPENDIX A 
APPENDIX A: LEGAL RESEARCH 
Standards of Review, by Steven A. Childress & Martha S. Davis 
KF 4575 C48 1986 2 Vols. 
§5.2 Material Fact: (Rule 56C)(Substansive test) 
On review of a summary judgement, we do as the D.C. was 
required to do. We determine whether the record as it stands 
reveals any disputed issue of material fact, assume the reso-
lution of any such issue in favor of the non-movant, and 
determine whether the movant is then entitled to judgement as 
a matter of law. 
First jersey National Bank v. Dome Petroleum Ltd. 
723 F.2d 335, 338 (3rd Cir. 1983) 
§5.6 Abuse of Discretion: 
Clearly Erroneous Standard: 
Joseph v. St. Charles Parish School, 736 F.2d 1036 (5th Cir. 1984) 
Calderera v. Eastern Airlines, 705 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1983) 
Rule 60(b) Order relief from a judgement or order on grounds 
of mistake, excusable neglect to'fraud or general fairness. 
Plain Error/Manifest Miscarriage of Justice: 
Clearly erroneous: based on substantial error, erroneous view 
of the law. 
Abuse of discretion: a decision that is manifestly unreasonable, 
illogical, or not supported by the evidence; clearly erron-
eous or unjust. 
De Novo: Anew, over again; a second time 
De Novo trial: trying a case again as if the first trial had 
not taken place. 
CASE LAW, STARE DECISIS: 
247 P.2d 264 
Crellin v. Thomas: 
Discretion is reposed in TC to grant or deny motion for 
new trial on basis of newly discovered evidence... reviewed 
as Abuse of Discretion. 
260 P.2d 741 
Warrent v. Dixon Ranch Co. et al; Allowance of vacation of 
judgement is a creature of equity designed to relieve against 
the harshness of enforcing a judgement resulting from ... 
wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes preventing 
presentation of claim or defense. .Review as Abuse of Discre-
tion. Excusable neglect, illness and notice given the other 
party. 
APPENDIX A 
375 P.2d 28 
Kettner v. Snow: Motion must be made within 10 days. Discre-
tion in granting new trial and relief from judgement within a 
reasonable time, not to exceed 3 months. 
590 P.2d 309 
Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City, Utah: timely 
motion for new trial terminates running time of appeal. Does 
not run again until such order or motion is entered. 
684 P.2d 52 
Larsen v. Collins: Abuse of discretion review of motion to 
set aside default judgement; TC discretion whether movant has 
shown mistake, inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect. 
765 P.2d 124 
NA 
776 P.2d 84 
Schindler v. Schindler: must demonstrate evidence is insuf-
ficient to support findings or otherwise clearly erroneous. 
APPENDIX B 
Barron v. Dr. Kelly, M.D. et al. 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BARRON, WILLIAM PAUL JR 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
KELLY, THOMAS M 
LDS HOSPITAL INC DEFENDANT 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. GILSON, JAMES W. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 890906515 CV 
DATE 05/08/91 
HONORABLE MICHAEL R MURPHY 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK MPB 
BASED ON REVIEW OF PLAINTIFF'S REPLY TO THE COURT'S ORDER TO 





Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company • American Motorists Insurance Company 
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company • American Protection Insurance Company 
Post Office Box 5347, Denver CO 80217 • 303 1696-1441 FAX 303)745-9481 
October 17, 1989 
William Paul Barron, Jr. 
Vista Park Apartments, No. 14 
611 Park Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102-3332 
Re: Our Insured: The Southland Corporation 
Our Claim No.: 717 LN 021493 N 
Date of Loss: March 27, 1989 
Dear Mr. Barron: 
We are in receipt of your correspondence to The Southland Corporation 
dated September 11, 1989, whereby you have provided them with your 
Affidavit and a diagram of the accident scene at the 7-Eleven Store 
in question. 
As I thought I explained to you in our conversation of September 6, 
1989, we are the liabili-ty carrier for The Southland Corporation and, 
therefore, if you have any questions in regard to your claim, they 
should be directed to us. 
Therefore, at this time I would ask that all future correspondence 
come to my attention. 
I have once again taken the opportunity to review your claim in order 
to determine if there is any liability on the part of The Southland 
Corporation. 
As an operator of a motor vehicle, you are under a high duty of care 
to maintain a proper lookout at all times while operating a motor 
vehicle. It is, therefore, our position that you failed to maintain 
a proper lookout in that you had a collision with a stationary object. 
Therefore, since it appears that you were more than 50% responsible 
for the collision, we will be unable to offer you any type of settlement 
in regard to the damage to your motor vehicle. 
If you have any questions regarding our decision, please do not hesitate 
to contact us. 
Very truly yours, 
On behalf of 








William Paul Barron, Jr. 
October 17, 1989 
Page 2 
cc: The Southland Corporation 
7-Eleven Stores 
Districts 1851 and 1852 
5288 South 320 West, Suite B-158 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Attention: Allen Pack 
Market Manager 
South Utah - 1852 
October 21, 1989 
Dennis Opl 
Claim Representative 
National Loss Control Service Corp. 
P.O. Box 5347 
Denver CO 80217 
Dear Mr. Opl; 
You explained in your conversation of September 6, 1989, that you were 
the liability carrier; however, you failed to provide a means to contact 
you. Further, you never responded, according to Utah Law, to my claim for 
damages in writing. 
Secondly, Utah law provides for a legal means against persons who obstruct 
movement of traffic in a manner calculated to induce injury or property damage. 
Therefore, please be advise of the attached lawsuit for violation Utah Annotated 
Code, § 76-10-801(1), and § 76-10-803(1)(a) and (c) inter alia. 
Sincerely yours, 
William P. Barron, Jr. 
611 Park St., Apt. #14 










Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Company • American Motorists Insurance Company 
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company • American Protection Insurance Company 
PostOffice Box 5347, Denver CO 80217 • 303 j 696-1441 FAX 303 J745-9481 
November 2 , 1989 
William Paul Barron, Jr. 
Vista Park Apartments, No. 14 
611 Park Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102-3332 
Re: Our Insured: The Southland Corporation 
Our Claim No.: 717 LN 021493 N 
Date of Loss: March 27, 1989 
Dear Mr. Barron: 
This letter will inform you that we are in receipt of your proposed 
suit against our insured. 
We are also in receipt of the photographs that you took on 
September 10, 1989, of the accident location. I also have 
photographs of the area as well as a diagram which gives us precise 
measurements of the parking lot. 
It is still our contention that our insured is not in any way liable 
for the damage which you sustained to your vehicle. I believe the 
pictures make it obvious that you were not maintaining the proper 
lookout when you drove into the cement poles which surround the gas 
island. 
I am forwarding the draft of your proposed suit to our defense firm 
and have asked that they defend the various defendants in the event 
that you actually go through with your litigation. 
It would appear that, based on my investigation, many of the various 
counts which you are alleging in your suit are frivolous and, 
therefore, we will be asking our attorneys to file the necessary 
motion so that we can collect our defense costs. 
Very truly yours, 
On behalf of 




November 4, 1989 
Dennis Opl 
Claim Representative 
NATIONAL LOSS CONTROL SERVICE CORPORATION 
Kemper National P & C Companies 
P.O. Box 5347 
Denver CO 80217 
Dear Mr. Opl, 
By now you should be aware that formal litigation has commenced in the 
Third Judicial Circuit Court for the State of Utah against you and other 
defendants in this matter. Enclosed herein, or under separate cover, you 
will also find a subpeona duces tecum. 
As a former investigator for the United States Government, I firmly 
believe that your process of investigation, or deductive reasoning are 
seriously flawed. If you look closely at the photographs, from the driving 
angle, they are nearly indistinguishable against the light poles in the pump 
island - as they as essentially the same color. 
What is obvious - to any reasonable and competent person - is that any 
driver, unfamiliar with the station or the area, approaching the pump island 
from that angle on a dark, moonless night, would be unable to see a black 
post, against dark green pumps and black light post, even with maintaining 
the proper lookout. 
As far as the threat of Rule 11 sanctions, bear in mind that you must 
prove my suit to be knowingly frivolous, and brought "to the best of his 
knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well 
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law, or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it 
is not interposed for any improper purpose,..." Therefore, we'll have to 
let a judge and jury decide the merits of your frivolous arguments for 
denying a just claim. 
Sincerely yours, 
William P. Barron, Jr. 
6H Park St. #14 
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332 
cc: 
John Call, Attorney-at-Law 




TRIAL TRANSCRIPT OF JULY 16, 1990 
BEFORE JUDGE PAUL G. GRANT 



























IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, SALT LAKE COUNT^C*/ 
V 
-oOo-




7-11 STORES, CITGO PETROLEUM 





Case No. &faM9&A CVO$ 
MOTION TO DISMIsJty Cfy 
>7K 
J / "J 
- o O o -
BE IT REMEMBERED that/on the 16th day of July, 1990, 
the above-entitled matter came' on for hearing before the 
Honorable Paul G. Grant, sitting as Judge in the above-named 
Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the following 
proceedings were had. 
-oOo-
APPEARANCES: 
For the Plaintiff: 
For the Defendant: 
No appearance 
MR. T. J. TSAKALOS 
Attorney at Law 
4 Triad Center, #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8.4180 
ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 














he sued Charter Summit Hospital and several people and that--
pro se, and that has been dismissed. On June 25, f89, he sued 
Midvale City and Midvale P.D. and that was dismissed. On 
October 31 of '89, he sued the State of California and the 
California Department of Food & Agriculture, 'cause they stopped 
him at the border, wouldn't allow him to bring in fruit and 
vegetables. That was dismissed in the United States District 
Court. On November 29, '89, he re-filed that suit again and that 
has been dismissed. 
November 16, '89, he sued the State of Utah and the 
Utah State Tax Commission for his taxes. I think that one has 
been dismissed, and then he sued us v/hen our pumps did not get 
out of his way, and now has not appeared. 
14
 THE COURT: And your claim for attorney ls fees is how 
15
 I much? 
MR. TSAKALOS: I will prepare an affidavit. 
17 I THE COURT: All right. If you'll send that with the 
18 judgment. 
19
 \ MR. TSAKALOS: Thank you, your Honor, 
20 J (Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
21 




ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY, SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
16 
APPENDIX I> 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR. VS. 
SOUTHLAND CORPORATION was electronically recorded by the 
THIRD Circuit Court, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Utah. 
That the said witnesses were, before examination, duly 
sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth in said cause. 
That the said testimony of said witnesses was electronically 
recorded, and thereafter caused by me to be transcribed into 
type writing, and that a true, and correct transcription of 
said testimony so taken and transcribed is set forth in the 
foregoing pages numbered from 2 to 3 , inclusive 
and said witnesses testified and said as in the foregoing 
annexed testimony. 
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City, Utah, 





ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS 
10 WEST BROADWAY. SUITE 200 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84101 
APPENDIX E 
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTATION FOR 
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL 
William Paul Barron, Jr. Pro Se 
611 South Park Street, Apt. #14 
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SOOTHLAND CORPORATION, 7-11 STORES, 
KEMPER GROUP, CITGO PETROLEUM CORP. 
Defendants, 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. 893010924-CV 
Judge Paul Grant 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 59(a)(3) and 59(c), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, the Plaintiff hereby offers under oath the following reasons 
for requesting a new trial for accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. 
1. Due to the poverty of the Plaintiff, and his inability to pay for 
services, his telephone service was disconnected on June 19, 1990. 
2. Due to the multiple disabilities which the Plaintiff suffers, which 
includes a heart condition Mitral Valve Prolapse Syndrome, Plaintiff was ill 
on Monday, July 16, 1990, and incapacitated by his illness, 
3. Further, because Plaintiff did not have telephone service, he was 
neither able to summon assistance, nor advise the court or the Defendants of 
his inability to proceed on the trial date originally set. 
Dated this 19th day of July, 1990 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR 





STATE OF UTAH ) 
) SS: 
SALT LAKE COUNTY) 
I, Puyol Bang, Manager of the Vista Park Apartments at 607-611 South 
540 East (Park Street), Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, have been acquainted 
with William Barron since May 1990, when my wife and I became the new 
resident managers. 
During that time, I have observed Mr. Barron become weak and ill on 
several occassions. Also, on several occassions I have checked on him in 
his apartment when he would be helping me, and find that he had collapsed 
on the floor and unable to stand-up. 
Also, on July 21, 1990, Mr. Barron was found on the sidewalk in front 
of the apartment complex, and was transported by ambulance to LDS Hospital 
Mr. Barron seems to have good days when he is able to render assistanc 
to me by watering the lawn, picking up trash, or sweeping; and other days 
when he looks and acts ill, or after working a short while begins to stumb! 
and needed assistance back to his apartment. 
On Monday, July 16, 1990, he did not come out of his apartment until 
in the early evening, and had been ill the night before. This was not an 
uncommon occurrance, and no particular alarm was attached to his absence. 
Dated this 1st Day of August, 1990. 
-1-
Subscribed and sworn to before me, A Notary Public/ on this 1st day of 
August, 1990, the aforesaid Affidavit of Puyol Bang, 607 Park St. #15, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102. 
-2-
EXHIBIT 
William Paul Barron, Jr. Pro Se 
611 Park Street, Apt. #14 
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332 
(801) 364-5243 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL CIPCUIT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




THE SOUTHLAND CORPORATION, ET AL : Civil No. 893010924-CV 
Defendants, : Judge Grant 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer the following questions as fully as possible 
and cited any medical rationale for the opinions stated herein. 
1. How long have you treated William Paul Barron, Jr. 
a: I have treated Mr. Barron since January 28, 1987. 
2. What is the nature of the treatment, and diagnosis of Mr. Barron? 
a. Mr. Barron's diagnoses are: (1) Major Depression, recurrent in remission. 
(2) Dysthymia; and (3) M>tr«xValve prolapse. His treatment has included 
^ antidepressant medication and individual psychotherapy,. 
3. what has been the course of Mr. Barron's treatment (i.e. how well 
has he responded to therapy), nature of remission and re-occurence, and 
prognosis? Mr. Barron has experienced waxing and waning synptoms of depression and 
cardiac symptoms, all synptoms aggravated by stress, all synptoms with at best partial 
response to treatment efforts. I expect that course to continue in the future. 
4. Has Mr. Barron ever been diagnosed with having conflict with 
authority figures? If yes, specify. Curing his course of treatment Mr. Barron 
has repeated conflicts with enployers and other authorities. 
5. Has Mr. Barron ever been diagnosed with having a history of violent 
behavior, suicidal ideation, or violent ideation? If yes, specify nature and 
target of behavior or ideation. Mr. Barron has experienced frequent episodes of suicidal 
ideation and fantasies of doing violence to others, especially others in authority, 
though I do not recall episodes of violent behavior during the past three years. 
6. In the aforesaid case Mr. Barron alleges mental anguish and suffering 
by Defendant's denial of a claim for damages to his automobile. Mr. Barron 
maintains that the denial by Kemper Insurance Group was improper/ and that in 
the period from March 1989 to September 1989 while was waiting for a response, 
that he suffered extreme stress. During the period from September 1989 to 
October 1989, he suffered additional stress, anguish and suffering from a 
psychological nature due to the negative dealings with the insurance company, 
and with the defendants attorney thereafter. What is your medical opinion of 
Mr. Barron's claims, and the medical rationale for that opinion. 
Curing the months in guestion, Mr. Barron's synptoms waxed and waned. He exper-
ienced a variety of stressors during the time, and also underwent a change in his 
antidepressant medication. While he was experiencing stress and suffering during 
those months, it is inpossible for me to attribute any particular proportion of 
that suffering to his negative dealings with the insurance company and with the 
defendants attorney. 
This statement consists of two pages, with Q pages addended with 
continuation of answers to the aforesaid guestions. 
Dated this £_ th day of YA(LL / 1990. LM-
DR. MICHAEL R. vL0WRY,uMD. 
Wasatch Canyons Professional Bldg. 
5770 South 1500 West #110 
Salt Lake City UT 84123 
SUBSCRIBED to and sworn before roe a Notary Public, this U- th day of 
l\QUi , 1990, in Salt Lake City UTAH. 
*t 
[SEAL] 
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APPENDIX G 
OTHER BARRON LITIGATION CITED 
BY APPELLEES' COUNSEL IN TRIAL TRANSCRIPT 
ARGUING FOR DISMISSAL ON BAD FAITH GROUNDS 
Barron v. State of California et al 
Barron v. Charter-Summit Hospital et al 
Barron v. City of Midvale et al 
Barron v. State of Utah and Utah Tax Commission 
MAG CLOSED 
CONSOL 
U.S. District Court 
District of Utah (Central) 
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 89-CV-983 
Barron v. Tracey, et al Filed: 10/31/89 
Assigned to: Judge J. Thomas Greene 
Referred to: Judge Ronald N. Boyce 
Demand: $0,000 Nature of Suit: 440 
Lead Docket: None Jurisdiction: Federal Question 
Dkt# in other court: None 
Cause: 18:241 Conspiracy Against Citizen Rights 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR. William Paul Barron, Jr. 
plaintiff [COR LD NTC] [PRO SE] 
611 South Park Street 
Apt. #14 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102-3333 
801-364-5243 
V. 
M. E. TRACEY 
defendant 
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FOOD 
AND AGRICULTURE INSPECTION 
defendant 
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
defendant 















include all events. MAG 
Barron v. Tracey, et al CLOSED CONSOL 
Complaint filed; assigned to Judge Greene (ba) 
[Entry date 11/1/89] 
Motion by William Paul Barron Jr., to proceed in forma 
pauperis and order (ba) [Entry date 11/1/89] 
Order of Reference re: 636(b)(1)(B) signed by JTG 11/16/89 
(mp) [Entry date 11/28/89] 
Case referred to Judge Ronald N. Boyce (mp) 
Notice of voluntary dismissal by pltf (mp) 
[Entry date 1/2/90] 
Case closed (mp) [Entry date 1/5/90] 
Order, consolidating cases 89-C-983G and 89-C-1056S with 
all further docketing to appear on 89-C-983 signed by RNB 
1/19/90 (mp) [Entry date 6/19/90] 
Report and Recommendations of Judge Ronald N. Boyce . 
Objections to R and R due by 3/4/90 (Jul) 
[Entry date 2/23/90] 
Objections by William Paul Barron Jr. to R&R (mp) 
[Entry date 3/2/90] 
Memorandum Decision granting [5-1] report and 
recommendations and pltf complt is dismissed signed by 
JTG (mp) 
Memorandum Decision, pltf's Mot for Reconsideration be and 
the same hereby is denied; dism of pltf's elms in federal 
ct is w/o prej to pursuit of such elms in state court if 
such elms can properly be asserted in a court of competent 
jurisdiction signed by JTG 8/14/90; cciattys (ch) 
[Entry date 8/16/90] 
Notice of filing of commentary on case law by William Paul 
Barron Jr. (mr) [Entry date 12/20/90] 
Docket as of July 8, 1991 2:20 pm Page 2 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ti&Mll 912$Q 
CENTRAL DIVISION ^ARKl'S B Zii^JPD „. 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, 
et al., 
Defendants. 





The plaintiff, William Paul Barron, Jr., filed suite in 89-
C-986G against the State of California and M.E. Tracy. 
Subsequently, plaintiff filed the same substantive action in 89-
C-1056 S and added The California Department of Food and 
Agriculture Inspection. Since the actions involve common 
questions of law and fact, therefore, in accordance with Rule 42, 
r.R.C.P., 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above two actions 89-C-983 G 




. £•//-, Jan  , J.??U. 
t h i s /' day o f iSaaaesabaBX^ XSt&B. 
BY THE COURT: 
1 /, 
Ronald N. Boyce V 
United States Magistrate 
O 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT > 
DISTRICT OF UTAH - CENTRAL DIVISION 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE STATES OF CALIFORNIA, 
THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT 
OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURAl 





Civil NO. 89-C-983G 
Plaintiff has submitted a document to this court which, 
in essence, is a motion to reconsider this court's Memorandum 
Decision and Order of April 23, 1990. The court has reviewed the 
entire file and has determined that oral argument would not be of 
material assistance to this court's determination. Accordingly, 
this court will render its decision on the basis of the existing 
record. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The instant case involves a suit1 by William Paul 
Barron, under the privileges and immunities clause of the 
1
 Originally there were two separate suits, 89-C-983G and 89-C-1056S. These cases were 
consolidated on January 19, 1990. 
Fourteenth Amendment, Title 18 U.S.C. § 241 & 242 and 42 U.S.C. § 
1981, 1982, and 1985(3). 
In it's Memorandum Decision and Order of April 23, 1990 
this court upheld the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation 
dismissing the plaintiff's complaint because (1) Suit in this 
court against the State of California and the California 
Department of Food and Agriculture is prohibited by the Eleventh 
Amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) Suit against 
M.E. Tracey may not be maintained in federal court because none 
of the jurisdictional basis alleged are valid;2 (3) A Bivens type 
of claim under the Fourteenth Amendment may not be maintained 
against a state officer because Congress has provided a remedy 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (not pleaded by plaintiff); and (4) Venue 
for such a claim is not in this district under 28 U.S.C. §1391 
(b). 
ANALYSIS 
Plaintiff's Basis for Reconsideration 
Because of the apparent sincerity and earnestness of 
plaintiff's petition, this court again will discuss the merits of 
2
 18 U.S.C. §241 and 242 are criminal statutes and do not provide a jurisdictional basis 
for a civil claims in federal court; 42 U.S.C. §1981 protects blacks, minorities and other identifiable 
classes of persons based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics from discrimination and grants them 
equal rights under the law; 42 U.S.C. 1982 relates to the equal protection rights of minorities to 
be treated the same as whites with reference to property; and 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) involves certain 
conspiracies, not involved in this claim, and requires a showing of racial or other class based 
discrimination. None of these statutes constitute a proper basis for jurisdiction. There is no 
allegation regarding race, minority status or class based discrimination. 
2 
plaintiff's claims. Plaintifffs basis for reconsideration appear 
to be: (1) U.C.A. 76-1-107 should provide a civil remedy for 
violations of 18 U.S.C. 241 and 242; (2) 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982, 
1983, and 1985 apply, regardless of the case law, to everyone 
without a showing of minority status or discrimination; (3) The 
Constitution itself gives authority to the proposition that the 
14th-16th amendments negate the 11th amendment; (4) The actions 
of the inspector were clearly illegal; and (5) Service of process 
was proper. 
As to plaintiff's first objection, regardless of 
whatever the effect of U.C.A. 76-1-1073 may be in state court, 
sections 241 and 242 of Title 18 United States Code do not confer 
jurisdiction in federal court.4 
As to plaintiff's second objection, that 42 U.S.C. 
1981, 1982, 1983, and 1985 apply to his claims and to everyone 
without a showing of minority status, regardless of contrary case 
U.C.A. 76-1-107 provides in pertinent part: 
(c) This act does not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right or 
liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture, impeachment , or other 
remedy authorized by law to be recovered or enforced in a civil 
action, administrative proceeding, or otherwise, regardless of 
whether the conduct involved in the proceeding constitutes an 
offense defined in this code. 
4
 See Christian Populist Party of Arkansas v. Secretary of State of Arkansas. 650 F. Supp. 
1205 (D.C.E.D. Ark. 1987); Garrison v. Newell 55 F.R.D. 550 (D.C. Va 1972). 
3 
law, this is simply not the law. The law clearly requires a 
showing of minority status or discrimination.5 
As to plaintiff's third objection, that the 
Constitution itself gives authority to the proposition that the 
14th-16th amendments negate the 11th amendment, once again there 
is no authority for this extreme and groundless proposition. 
This court again rejects the argument. 
As to plaintiff's fourth objection, that the actions of 
the inspector were illegal, such is irrelevant because this 
court's decision and the magistrate's decision were based on lack 
of jurisdiction to pursue such a claim in federal court. 
As to plaintiff's fifth objection, that service of 
process was proper, such is irrelevant because this court's 
decision and the magistrate's decision were based on lack of 
jurisdiction and not failure of service of process. 
Based upon the court's analysis, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's Motion for 
Reconsideration be and the same hereby is denied. Dismissal of 
plaintiff's claims in federal court is without prejudice to 
pursuit of such claims in state court if such claims can properly 
be asserted in a court of competent jurisdiction. 
5
 See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraii. _ U.S. _ , 107 S.Ct. 2022 (1987); City of 
Memphis v. Greene. 451 U.S. 100 (1981); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee. 637 F. 2d 743 (10th Cir. 1980). 
4 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: August Yt, 1990. 
5MAS GREENE 




Unxted States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
August 16, 1990 
* * MAILING CERTIFICATE OF CLERK * * 
Re: 2:89-cv-00983 
True and correct copies of the attached were mailed by the clerk to the 
following: 
William Paul Barron Jr. 
611 South Park Street 
Apt. #14 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102-3333 
w^^i^.i^ic*. >•**, cy. '^ J*-* «Lii£*Uk£ C5> frtti•'*-•.-.CC iiws 
DISTRICT COURT 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR., PRO SE 
Vista Park Square Apartments #14 
611 Park Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102-3332 
(801) 364-5243 
AUG 9 3 26PM'89 
THJfcf J.:.Y,C -\i DISTRICT 
SALT ^^OUJHBI f 
BY -jY I -J-
'DEPUTY/CLERK 
/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




BARRY ADAMS, BRENDON (SURNAME 
UNKNOWN), JERRY LARCHER, SCOTT 




Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
William P. Barron, Jr., acting pro se, hereby voluntarily 
dismisses with prejudice his Complaint in the above-entitled 
action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
DATED t h i s S)fsA~ day of \*J^^ , 1 9 8 9 . 
V, 
ILLIAM P . BARRON, ESC. 
DAVID W. SLAGLE A2975 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Eleventh Floor, 
Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 521-9 000 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR., 
-, . _ „ JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL 
Plaintiff, 
vs. No. 890903923CV 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
CHARTER-SUMMIT HOSPITAL, 
BARRY ADAMS, BRENDON (SURNAME 
UNKNOWN), JERRY LARCHER, SCOTT 
DAVIS, and DOES UNKNOWN, 
Defendants. 
It appearing to the Court that the plaintiff in the 
above-captioned claim has filed a Voluntary Dismissal pursuant 
to Rule 41(a)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and good 
cause appearing therefor, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the above-captioned 
case be and the same hereby is dismissed with prejudice, 
the parties to bear their own costs. 
AUG 1 1 1989 
By-
day of August, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
7 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT U K E COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH. 
DATEj. VAu.a, \QQ 
T T T r w > f v ^ 
- 2 -
r i i x o iMOTKiCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
ALLAN L. LARSON #A1896 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake city, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM PAUL BARRON, JR., 
Plaintiff, STIPULATION, MOTION AND 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
vs. 
THE CITY OF MIDVALE UTAH, 
THE CITY OF MIDVALE POLICE 
DEPARTMENT, OFFICERS WILLIAM 
NILES, STRONG AND SGT. LLOYD, Civil NO. 890903924 
AND DOES UNKNOWN, 
Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
Defendants. 
STIPULATION AND MOTION 
The above-named plaintiff and defendants hereby stipulate 
and move that plaintiff's Complaint and Amended Complaint as 
against said defendants be dismissed with prejudice, each of the 
parties to bear their own costs incurred, said action having been 
fully compromised to the satisfaction of all parties. 
JAN 2 <t 1990 
0^ SALT^Kc ow JNX*^/ I 
s Dated this /% day of Vet'yUA,:* 
U ^ 
, 1990. 
William Paul Barron, Jr. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
L. L a r s o n 
A t t o r f o r D e f e n d a n t s 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing Stipulation and Motion, and good 
cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
ORDERED that plaintiff1s Complaint and Amended Complaint be 
dismissed with prejudice, each of the parties to bear their own 
costs incurred. 
Dated th day of , 1990 
26\ ALIA 1 <*715.003\p1 dg. smo 
Timothy R. Hanson 
District Court Judge 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF. UTAH. 
June 7, 1991 APPBIDIX B-4/1 
Hon. James K. Logan, Esq. 
Circuit Court Justice 
United States Court of Appeals 
10th Circuit Court 
1961 Stout Street 
Denver CO 80294 
Dear Sir: 
I am writing in reference to your decision in Barron v. Utah and Utah 
State Tax Commission, Case No. 90-4092, from the United States District Court 
for the Central Division of the District of Utah, dated February 29, 1991. 
The basis of your decision is that "Barron has not shown that an adequate 
remedy is unavailable in the state courts." 
I had originally intented to file an appeal with the United States Supreme 
Court. The basis would be that (1) because of the Court's decision in the 
Davis decision, Utah's claim for exemption from jurisdiction in federal courts 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1341 is lacking merit precisely because of the Davis decision, 
or a good faith argument for a change, should the Court be inclined to uphold 
the Defendants' position; and (2) that adequate remedy is lacking in Utah 
State Courts for impecunious litigants. 
With regard to the latter, and with reference to the aforesaid reasoning 
in your decision, I would offer the following example. In 1988, I attempted 
to initiate proceedings for malpractice and breach of fudiciary trust (i.e. 
unauthorized disclosure of medical information and records) by a doctor. 
Under Utah law, a prelitigation panel review by the Utah Department of Commerce, 
Division of Professional & Occupational Licensing is required prior to initia-
ting any claim for malpractice in Utah State Courts. Papers were prepared 
and delivered to the appropriate agency as required under Rule 4 of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure by a third party. For the next three years, repeated 
attempts to procure the required panel review met with no sucess. I personally 
made several appearances before Loretta Jiron, the panel review secretary; 
and finally had a review scheduled in October 1990. On the day in question, 
I was the only person to make an appearance; Ms. Jiron informed me that they 
would need to re-schedule. History repeated itself, until on May 10, 1991, 
the action was dismissed without prejudice by Judge Murphy. 
I would submit that just because a remedy is proscribed and available 
under Utah law in the state courts, if that remedy is not upheld both the 
agencies charged with providing the remedy or recourse, then "adequate remedy 
is unavailable in the state courts." State and federal law provide that 
all citizens shall enjoy equal access to the courts and justice, not just 
to those who can afford to procure the services of an attorney. Therefore, 
Page 2. June 7, 1991 
JUDGE LOGAN, 10th Circuit CA 
APPHJDIX B-4/2 
it logically follows that if the playing field is rendered level in this 
regard, then higher courts must assure that all citizens are receiving equal 
access and protection of the law, and that the lower courts and state agencies 
are holding true to the duty imposed upon them by the people as expressed 
by their agents, state and federal legislators. 
I am not requesting a reconsideration. Since leaving Utah, I have neither 
the health nor capacity to continue, and shall defer to the state case to 
present these issues promulgated by the Davis decision in hopes that the 
matter may again find a favorable hearing before the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Sincerely Yours, 
William P. Barron, Jr. 
11475 Holiday Way 
Hillsboro OH 45133-9368 
(513) 393-3925 
cc: 
1. R. Paul Van Damm, Utcih Attorney General 
2. Steven A. Trost, Utah Bar Association 
3. Hon. Norman Bangerter, Governor, State of Utah 
4. Judge David Sam, U.S. District Court 
5. Judge J. Thomas Green, U.S. District Court 
APPENDIX H 
MEMORANDUM TO APPELLEES' COUNSEL 

APPENDIX I 
MEMORANDUM TO TRIAL COURT 
October 29, 1989 
Hon. Judge Grant 
Third Judicial Circuit Court 
455 South 200 East, 5th Floor 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Dear Sir; 
I rechecked with the Secretary of State on two defendants in this matter, 
Kemper Group and Citgo Petroleum. Both have no registered agents in Utah. 
Kemper is the liability insurance carrier for the primary defendant: Southland 
Corporation dba Seven-Eleven Food Stores. Southland has a marketing agreement 
with Citgo, but Citgo itself, does not "technically" do business in Utah, and 
voluntarily withdrew its registration some time ago. 
Therefore, by my understanding of Rule 4(f)(2), mail service on Kemper 
and Citgo is proper, and hence the attached motion. If service upon Southland, 
as you suggested Friday, is effective service upon the other Defendants, then 
all is well; if not, then would you consent to this ex parte motion for 
alternative service upon Kemper and Citgo. 
Sincerely yours, 
William P. Barron, Jr. 
611 Park St. #14 
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332 
July 19, 1990 
T. J. Tsakalos #3289 
HANSON, EPPERSON, & SMITH 
4 Triad Center #500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-2970 
Dear Mr. Tsakalos, 
In reading your judgement entry you noted that I had six cases in 
state and federal court dismissed as logic for a bad faith filing. 
I don't suppose that you informed Judge Grant which were dismissed 
because of an out-of-court settlement, which are on appeal, and which were 
dismissed without prejudice for jurisdictional issues. 
Further, I don't suppose that you informed Judge Grant about the 
cases which I won. 
Sincerely yours, 
William Paul Barron, Jr. 
611 South Park St. #14 
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332 
cc: 
Judge Paul grant 
2 Incl: 
1. Affidavit 
2. Motion for New Trial 
July 31, 1990 
Hon. Paul Grant, Judge 
3rd Judicial Circuit Court 
451 South 200 East 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
RE: Barron v. Southland, Civil No. 893010924-CV 
Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial by Defendants 
Your Honor, 
Under Rule 59(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a Reply Memorandum is 
not ordinary to a Motion for New Trial; however, Mr. Tsakalos has so twisted 
and distorted the facts again, that I can not in good conscience remain 
silent. 
A previous Motion for Sanctions Under Rule 11, for prior abuse of 
judicial process, was filed against Mr. Tsakalos, for his blatant misrepre-
sentations in prior pleadingsFVwas never adjudicated by the Court. In one 
pleading he referenced a failing on my part quoting the Utah Annotated Code 
for a section that can not be found therein. Counsel for the Defendants is 
merely carrying on the tradition previously encountered with the Defendant 
Kemper Group themself. They procrastinate a reply to my claim for months, 
then respond by threatening me with sanctions if I challenge their decision 
in court. Throughout these proceedings Mr. Tsakalos has abused his privi-
lege as an officer of the court by using inflamatory and scurrilous language 
in his proceedings to attack my motives and manner of obtaining a redress of 
grievances that the Defendants refuse to acknowledge. 
His objections, to use his language, are self-serving. (1) If there 
have been 55 "pleadings", Mr. Tsakalos is responsible for most. He has 
frustrated attempted at discovery^ which the Court ruled against himj and my 
ability to proceed with my grievance by legal trickery to shunt my claim out 
of the system. (2) Counsel for the Defense was provided with my medical 
evidence for the last 10 years or more, by actual documentation and summary, 
by his discovery, specifically delineating my multiple disabilities and how 
they affect my health. When forwarding last-minute evidence to him, I included 
a note, which I believe he acknowledged in an earlier pleading, of my current 
poor health. (3) The facts of the complaint are not so clear cut as Counsel 
suggests, as he conviently failed to note that I struck a post 23" from the 
gasoline island - not as he alleged (this time) the gasoline island; that the 
post struck was painted brown and in front of a pole painted brown/black and 
green gas pumps; and that the accident occurred at night. (4) As previously 
noted in my affidavit for a new trial, I did not appear at the trial because 
I was incapacitated by my condition, not to abuse or to frustrate the legal 
system, or to harass the Defendants, but to garner a modicum of justice. 
I have enclosed two affidavits in support of these statements. One, an 
affidavit dated May 2, 1990 from my treating physician outlining the medical 
disabilities and their effect upon me. Two, an affidavit authenticating a 
computer enhanced photograph of the accident cite, showing the accident site 
as it would have appeared on the night in question. As one can clearly see, 
the small post struck is nearly invisible in front of the pole behind it -
and bear in mind that the enhancement was made from a daylight photograph. 
Both of these affidavits were previously served upon the defendants counsel. 
Not having access to a legal dictionary at the present, I am not sure 
what Mr. Tsakalos is meaning when he states that my affidavit is "conclusory". 
I was following Rule 8(e)(1), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to be "simple, 
consise and direct". Rule 59, U.R.C.P. did not specify or require evidenciary 
memorandum to be submitted with the Affidavit. Further, counsel had sufficient 
medical evidence previously gained through discovery to know of my disability 
and its affect (and I believe callously took advantage of that fact, to engender 
enough stress to produce just such an outcome). 
If his objection is merely one for want of detail, it can be easily 
remedied. Because of my heart condition, mitral valve prolapse, ^ "frequently 
suffer episodes of cardiac syncopy, i.e. my heart "flutters" from arrythmias, 
and I collapse. [This has been documented for at least 10 years]. During the 
attack and for several hours thereafter, I am weak and unable to walk or get 
about. Certainly, it is impossible to walk or drive to the courthouse. I do 
not have a phone, and haven't had since it was disconnected for inability to 
pay on June 19, 1990. On the day of the trial, I had a syncopal episode in 
my apartment, collapsed and was not able to move for several hours. T did not 
have a phone, therefore, I could not call for assistance to get to a doctor, or 
oxygen (which can alleviate the symptoms quickly; nor call the court, clerk, or 
counsel until after I had recovered. During the preceding two weeks of the 
trial date, I had been ill several times, which is why I wrote Mr. Tsakalos a 
postit-note when remitting some last minute documents, so that he would be 
aware of why I might be late (although I did not consider not being able to 
attend, thinking it more liking collapsing in the courtroom, guaging the 
previous experience with Mr. Tsalkalos.) 
I regret the inconvience caused to the Court. I believe my complaint is 
legitimate with a good basis in case law that I've read. 
For Mr. Tsakalos to request "reimbursement as a condition precedent to 
granting the motion for a new trial" is an unfair advantage of his position 
of power. The Defendants, and by and thru counsel, have tried to intimidate 
me from pressing a legitimate claim, and have continually harassed me with 
lies and inuendos, and misrepresented facts, and threats of financial harm if 
I presented a claim in Court. Such intimidation should not be allowed. 
-2-
I will file Objections to Defendants Motion to Strike within ten (10) 
days, and I hope to speak with my attorney again for advice in this matter. 
However, due to my impecuniosity, I couldn't afford trial services, or 
lengthy litigation costs. At the outset it seemed a simple procedure, file 
the complaint and present evidence to establish one's testimony at a quickly 
set date. I never dreamed of all the legal trickery and shenaigans that have 
beset me since tangling with Mr. Tsakalos. 
I have already repaired the damage to my vehicle, but the emotional 
trauma is irreparable. 
Sincerely yours, 
William Paul Barron, Jr. 
611 South Park St. #14 




1. Counsel for Defendants, T.J. Tsakalos 
2. John Call, Attorney-at-Law 
611 South Park St. #14 
Salt Lake City OT 84102-3332 
September 23, 1990 
T. J. Tsakalos #3289 
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
4 Triad Center, Suite #500 
P.O. Box 2970 
Salt Lake City UT 84110-2970 
In re: Barron v. Southland .Corporation, et al 893010924-CV 
Dear Mr. Tsakalos, 
When I graduated from Bowling Green State University in 1984 with a degree 
in History, I considered myself, with a 3.85 grade point average, to be reasonably 
intelligent. I took several courses in American Political Thought and Constitu-
tional Law. My favorite case was Barron v. Baltimore (1833), as my forebearers 
not only aided the patriot cause during the War for Independence, but thereafter 
agitated for the rights thus gained for yeoman farmers, traders, merchants and 
the common people. 
Since I am acquainted with the not only the writings of Adams, Burke and 
Locke, who our founding fathers studied when formulating our government, but also 
those of Washington, Paine, Jefferson, Franklin, Madison and others who drew up 
the blueprints of our political and legal system, I quite frankly consider myself 
another compatriot of their works. As Abraham Lincoln said, we have a government 
of the people, by the people, and for the people. Therefore, our constitution and 
the English Common Law of our legal system is based upon that premise; and thereby, 
under § 68-3-1, Utah Annotated Code, the law and the legal system rests upon the 
premise of law of the people, by the people, and for the people. 
Something, as Jan Thompson's articles in The Deseret News attest, is out of 
sync with these principles. The Equal Access to Justice Act tries to address the 
issue of access to the judicial system, but does nothing to address the basic 
bias and injustice. For over 70 years, lawyers have predominated the legal sys-
tem and the legislature that enacts the laws. Lawyers also are our judges. All 
parties to a dispute are usually from the same background: counsel for plaintiff, 
defendant, and the bench are lawyers. The system therefore, is stacked against 
those who can not afford legal representation in the system; and in my personal 
experience, Utah courts are extremely biased against anyone, who" by necessity or 
choice, must act for themselves. 
A case in point. Judge Grant was the jurist who presided in the matter 
Continental Bank v. Barron & Barron (1988). Before proceeding, I spoke with my 
attorney, John W. Call - HENRIKSEN, HENRIKSEN, & CALL, who reviewed the claim and 
advised me that I had a case under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction; aided 
me in defining the areas that I needed to research and study. I did this at the 
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University of Utah Law Library, and proceeded in court by myself as I could not 
afford John's services as a barrister. I believe I presented the facts in 
court in line with the legal advise given in an intelligent and adequate manner. 
I was shocked, but not surprised, after summations when Judge Grant ruled 
against me then told me that I "should seek legal advice!" 
Not stated, but surely apparent, was Judge Grant!s assumption and bias that 
as a non-attorney, I didn't know what I was talking about; and the bias that only 
attorneys should be in court, except small claims, which is not really a court 
but a circus presided over by lawyers. 
Case in point: Barron v. Pacific Management (1987). This was prosecuted 
in small claims, and I did the legal research at the U. I won the case under 
the doctrine of trespass to personality, but the judgement was only $80 against 
a loss of $1,500-2,000 value of my car. The lawyer who presided, from what I 
was told, had substantia] investment in real estate and stock holdings in a 
property management firm, and should have recused. No appeal on the merits of 
the judgement, mitigated against my $400/month disability payment, was possible 
at the time. 
Throughout the course of these proceedings I never expected an easy victory, 
however, I did expect that professional ethics might have averted some of the 
abuses I was subjected too. 
1. You prepared the first certificate of readiness for trial that had 
facts that were knowingly presented which were false. 
2. Judge Grant ignored entirely an earlier Motion for Sanctions for the 
aforesaid insult, and denied a reguest for a More Definate Statement, when I 
pursued the meaning of a pleading of yours to a reference to § 41A-2-3, U.A.C. 
in a Motion to Quash as to Kemper Group. No such statute exists, according to 
my own and staff research at the UNIVERSITH LAW LIBRARY. 
3. You presented distorted information to justify a claim to "bad faith" 
on my part. 
Which cases did you justify to Judge Grant as indicative of "bad faith" 
because they were dismissed? Not one had a finding of bad faith, to the contrary. 
Were these among those presented: 
a. Barron v. The State of Utah et al (USDC UT 1990) - The court held that 
plaintiff was barred jurisdictionally under 28 U.S.C. § 1341. Plaintiff 
appealed to 10th Circuit Court of Appeals arguing grant of jurisdiction 
under 4 U.S.C. §111 and the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. Michigan 
(1989). 
b. Barron v. Office of Personnel Management et al (USDC UT 1989) - Parties 
had com? to agreement, and federal defendants agreed to waive collection 
action. Plaintiff's claims were settled by other Defendants. 
c. Barron v. State of California et al (USDC UT 1990) - The court dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction. Reconsidered "because of the apparent sincerity 
and earnestness of plaintiff's petition", the court ordered "Dismissal of 
Plaintiff's claims in federal court is without prejudice to pursuit of 
such claims in state court if such claims can properly be asserted in a 
court of competent jurisdiction." 
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d. Barron v. The City of Midvale et al (DC UT 1990) - Stipulation, Motion 
and order of Dismissal ... with prejudice, ... said action having been 
fully compromised to the satisfaction of all parties. 
e. Barron v. (Barter-Summit Hospital et al (DC UT 1990) - Voluntary 
Dismissal by Plaintiff pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1), U.R.C.P. as said action 
had been fully compromised to the satisfaction of all parties. 
f. Barron v. Salt Lake City, Utah (109 S.CRpts. 1968)- Certiori denied. 
This is a technical loss because I made a mistake in the appeals process, 
and delayed the filing to the U.S. Supreme Court. It was a moral victory, 
however, because a direct result of this suit is the signs you now see by 
the Clerk of Courts window concerning giving procedural advise. Also, 
because of this suit and complaints generated therefrom, Hon. Maurice Jones 
is a more pleasant and able juris based upon my recent observations. 
A principle of my religion teaches that we must deal honestly with all men. 
This is an article of faith that I ever endeavor to uphold. I do not undertake 
legal action lightly. I research the matter at the University law library to 
see what the case law and statutes relate about ray problem, and I seek advice 
from my Stake President, who is a competent attorney-at-Law from all indications, 
as appropriate. I am keenly sensitive to injustice, having been exposed to enough 
injustice in the 20 years since my return from the Vietnam War; but I never under-
take an action in Bad Faith. 
For the present, you may delight in your hallow victory. I sensed from 
Mr. Opl at Kemper Group Insurance, from the very beginning, that this might happen. 
He was adamant in the proposition that no one challenges the Insurance Company in 
Court without an attorney and gets away with it. The precedent would be too 
damaging to the business, right? After all, if an impecunious litigant acting 
Pro se could initiate a lawsuit, overturn the insurance companies position, force 
action to remove or ameliorate a road hazard and nuisance at a client business, 
or perhaps set a new path in stare decisis, the precedent would overwhelm the 
industry with other agrieved claimants who were bullied by a claims agent and 
insurance company, right? 
Well, it ain't over until itfs over, or until the fat lady sings, as the 
old saying goes. It is a matter of justice and principle!! Or as Davy Crockett 
said, "When you're right, act on it." 
Sincerely Yours, \j 
William P. Barron, Jr. / 
cc: 
Judge Grant 
John W. Call, Attorney 
Jan Thompson, The Deseret News 
APPENDIX J 
MEDICAL EVIDENCE PROVIDED UNDER DISCOVERY 
TO APPELLEES' COUNSEL AND 
SUBMITTED IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
WASATCH CANYONS HOSPITAL 
5770 South 1500 West, Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Ju l y 23, 1991 
William P. Barron, Jr. 
11475 Holiday Way 
Hillsboro, OH 45133-9368 
Dear Mr. Barron, 
This is in response to your letter of July 2, in which you 
asked for an opinion from me as to whether symptoms of mitral valve 
prolapse can result in incapacitation and whether you actually 
became incapacitated on July 16, 1990. 
My records show that we visited on June 4 of that year and not 
again until August 30. You wrote me a letter between those two 
visits, on August 20. I do not find details regarding the incident 
of July 16, 1990, in my notes or in your letter. They reflect that 
you were under the care of Dr. Towner at that time for evaluation 
of fatigue. At both of our visits you complained of a number of 
depressive symptoms. Your letter referred to occasional 
"collapses" from "fatigue, angina, or migraine pains, or whatever 
you cal1 it." 
I do not consider myself an expert in mitral valve prolapse 
and cannot provide an opinion as to whether or under what 
circumstances it can result in incapacitation. I can say that 
during your course of treatment under my supervision there were 
many episodes of temporary incapacitation from depression and a 
variety of physical symptoms including fatigue. 
I hope this is of some assistance to you and hope that you are 
doing wel1. 
Sincerely, 
Michael R. Lowry, M.D. 
MRL/ps 
July 2, 1991 
Dr. Michael R. Lowry, MD 
Wasatch Canyons Professional bldg. 
Suite 108 
5770 South 1500 West 
Salt Lake City UT 84123 
Dear Dr. Lowry, 
In preparing an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, the opposing 
counsel has complained that previous medical evidence is not sufficient 
to establish my contention that on July 16, 1990, I was incapacitated 
due to cardiac syncopy, migraine, or whatever caused the problems. 
Would you provide me a statement as soon as possible [my brief must 
be before the Court of Appeals no later than July 26, 1991]. 
Specifically, you letter must address the following issues: 
(1) Whether the symptoms of this condition (mitral valve prolapse) 
actually result in incapacitation? [I presume a summary of cardiac 
problems such as syncopal episodes from MVP Syndrome, brought on by physical 
or emotional problems, or other causes, results in incapacitation, how, 
duration, etc.] 
(2) Your opinion as to whether the appellant actually became incapa-
citated on the day of the hearing (July 16, 1990). Since I did not seek 
medical treatment that day, and only broached the subject subsequent to 
the event to you on a later day, I presume he seeks corroboration that if 
I said I was out, and the apartment manager testified to several incidents, 
that these opinions be medically assessed. 
I am staying at my parents at the present and if you need further 
information, please call (513) 393-3925. 
Sincerely yours, 
William P. Barron, Jr. 
11475 Holiday Way 
Hillsboro OH 45133-9368 
cc: 
T. J. Tsakalos, Attorney-at-Law 
May 18, 1990 
Dr. Michael R. Lowry, MD 
Wasatch Canyons Hospital 
Professional Bldg., Suite #108 
5770 South 1500 West 
Salt Lake City UT 84123-5352 
Dear Dr. Lowry, 
I had a court hearing on Monday concerning the dispute with Dr. Kelly 
and LDS Hospital and that unauthorized release of information. The hearing 
left me unsettled as I was not able to function properly, and become depressed 
afterwards. 
The incidents were similar in the nature of my response, to wit: 
1. Before Judge Murphy, I froze and was not able to respond to the 
situation, when the judge said that he was confused as to whether proper 
procedures were taken based upon the papers filed. This was a surprise, 
because each item was clearly irprked, and readable; it was written in mostly 
plain english as I am not proficient in all the legal jargon. I was not 
able to respond well after that, I was stuck on the notion that I was not 
clear in my communication, for which I always recieved high praise and marks 
for in college. 
2. A few weeks ago, another man and I backed into each other at a 
Bank parking lot. He came out of his car, and verbally machine-gunned me 
about how the accident was all my fault. I had only used my mirrors and 
had not turned my head, but he was backing out as well. Then he began to 
say how the police would cite me, and my insurance would go up $250/year, 
etc., but he'd take $100 and forget the whole thing. I couldn't function 
in the situation to defend myself, similar to the above. 
3. When Ruth Ann and I were at the first custody hearing, Commissioner 
Peuller said that my complaint over visitation rights was "the most flagrant 
abuse of iudicial process she (sic) ever saw", etc. Afterwards, I was almost 
unable to present my complaint, stumbling over words, etc. 
I am not sure what is happening in these types of situation, except 
that my thinking and organization prepared beforehand becomes scrambled, 
and I don't function thereafter well. After this event has ended, T become 
very depressed, then very angry, like someone used or abused me. 
Sincerely, 
William P. Barron, Jr. 
611 Park St. #14 
Salt Lake City UT 84102-3332 
May 13, 1990 
Dr. Michael R. Lowry, MD 
Wasatch Canyons Hospital 
Professional Bldg, Suite #108 
5770 South 1500 West 
Salt Lake City ITT 84123-5352 
Doctor Lowry, 
While I am lucid, T wanted to make you aware of my current situation and 
condition. In the past two weeks, I have started to slide downwards. My 
present condition is thus: 
PHYSICAL: 
1. My sleep has been somewhat erratic in the last two weeks; either I 
toss and turn, or sleep 12 hours or more. If it gets worse, I thought about 
taking \ tablet of klonopin (.5mg tabs) to get a little better sleep. [A full 
tablet gives me a good rest, but 10-12 hours long; \ tab is good for 6-7 hours.] 
2. I wake-up with moderate to severe sciatic pain in my left leg, and 
lower back. It generally eases after moving around for awhile. 
3. I experience angina-like pain at least once a day for the last two weeks. 
This is usually associated with my walking the dog. 
4. I still suffer from chronic fatigue, and "muscle weakness" - or perhaps 
better stated, a feeling of weakness in my leg muscles, like they won't support 
my wieght. I experience an unsteady gait, and wobbliness during these periods. 
Dr. Towner's exam last March reveal no evident physical cause. Again, exercise, 
like walking the dog (which used to invigorate me, unless prolonged) will 
produced this after just a few short blocks. Last fall, I was riding my bike 
up to 3 miles a day, or walking for an hour before adverse effects were noticed. 
5. In the last two months, I have been having a severe headache about once 
a week that last several hours, and usually is only relieved by sleeping. The 
usual analgesics avail no relief. It feels like someone buried a hatchet into 
the crown of my head, and many times I can feel a throbbing sensation deep in 
my skull. A tension headache has always made my posterior neck and shoulder 
muscles ache, so this is different from what I have usually experienced. 
6. I still have the "lightning flashes" in my head before going to sleep, 
and upon waking; but now have them during the day, when I get yawning and 
sluggish feelings with the fatigue. 
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EMOTIONAL: 
1. I have been getting very depressed, more so as time goes by. But I 
have been experiencing a lot more stress in the last few weeks. 
2. My feelings range more in the area of the following now: hopelessness, 
futility, isolation, etc. 
3. I have been walking on the razor's edge with anger the past week. T 
received a denial on ray VA appeal; when I went into the VA to discuss the reasons 
and rationale behind the decision, I got a little pissed-off, and threw some .45 
caliber ammunition at the VA rep and told him what to do with them. [I thought 
the police were after me later, while waling Sarah, as three or four cars were 
erasing the neighborhood. But they weren't.] When I came home, I sequestered 
myself in bed for a few days, until it was safe to venture outside again. While 
locked in, I fought thoughts and feelings about improvising some munitions and 
assaulting the Federal Bldg. or the Courthouse, but no one would take care of 
Sarah, and with my polyuria, I couldn't hold hostages long enough unless it was 
in the bathroom. Now I'm just depressed and numb. 
STRESSORS: 
1. Donald went back to juvenile detention last Tuesday. He stole some 
money (my last $2.00), and disappeared all day. The week before he was almost 
picked-up for drinking with an adult who had a case of beer and a bag of weed 
that was being passed around several other youngsters. Then he stayed out all 
night, and disappeared when he spent the weekend with his mother. When he got 
out of DT, he grabbed me by the neck when I didn't give him the $50 of his 
paycheck that I reimbused those he stole from. (He wanted to hold the money 
while we went looking for shoes and clothes.) 
2. Tomorrow, Donny goes back to court for possession of tobacco when he 
was picked up last week, and in the afternoon, I have a hearing on my dispute 
with IDS Hospital and Dr. Kelly over an unauthorized letter he sent to DOL five 
years ago. 
3. The VA denied my claim for service-connected disability from agent 
orange and PTSD again, and my representative and I have to redo all the appeals 
papers again to send to the Board of Appeals in Washington, D.C. Ruth Ann has 
been nagging about letting her friend in the VFW take-over, and another friend 
who supervises the VFW service officers, based in D.C, to pitch in too! 
4. Friday, I have a trial for a citation for incompetent driver. I loaned 
my car to a neighbor, and her husband backed into another car. His license had 
expired the week before on his birthday, so I was cited. (When I first let them 
use the car in January, they both had out-of-state, but valid licenses.) Now 
I could lose my driver's license, face a $300 fine, or have my insurance cancelled. 
[And ever since the Prosecutor's office lost the case when I appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court two years ago, they have been itching to get even.] 
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5. I'm still burning over my loss in U.S. District Court, to learn that 
"every" and "all" in the Civil Rights Act only applies to blacks and minorities. 
White is black, and black is white; it's crazy when the law doesn't mean what it 
says in plain English. No wonder no ones trust the courts or government, like 
Danny DeVito said, "Q^ What do you call 20,000 lawyers at the bottom of the 
ocean. A^ A good beginning." 
6. Isolation. Lots of it. I don't have friends in the usual sense of 
the word. No one calls or visits me on their own volition, except infrequently. 
I usually go wandering among acquaintances, or calling the family long distance 
when I need to talk with someone. I seldom socialize as I always feel like people 
don't like having me around, because I stutter, or sound funny, or just ain't 
charismatic or witty. I don't date; don't know anyone, or have the money to do 
so even if I was inclined; and in our stake, we're an ignored bunch anyway. Even 
Jessica doesn't call or come over; and Donny is out getting into trouble. 
7. Losing the battle with the kids. Donny is so up-and-down, I don't know 
if he'll turn around or not. He picked up all my bad habits, and seems headed 
for bigger trouble. Jessica hasn't been around or had much contact since Donny 
has been here; she seems annoyed or embarassed of me around her yuppie friends, 
except when they need a ride (I'm being too harsh here probably). 
8. A hundred little things everyday that grate like rocks in your shoes. 
No wonder my memory is so bad anymore; forget fulness can be a blessing in 
disquise, except I don't remember why I'm so down. 
I don't understand why everything has went to seed so fast in the past few 
weeks. Everytime I think that things are starting to pull out, I get hit with 
a storm, and it all comes unraveled. If I feel in a better mood, I'm too tired 
to do little projects like fix and put-together a bike (it's been in pieces for 3 
months), or vice-versa. I get to where I seen to manage the everyday stuff, and 
think I'm just about ready to hold my own again; then something happens and I 
can't hold it together. 
Is it the medication, or I am missing something? Bob Bennett and I barely 
touched on survivor guilt, PTSD, and how conflict with authority may fit in, but 
never explored much further. [More trying to change some behaviors than learning 
how they came to be.] I'd go back to Dr. Towner, but I think he regards me strictly 
as a "nut" or "hypochondriac" case. No reason for the polyuria (diabetes seems 
ruled out); fatigue is pegged as mental; and heart symptoms are defined as mental, 
not serious, non-existent, or the luck-of-the-draw, depending upon which doctor 
I see. 
When I was having problems last fall, Dr. Walsh ran some EKG's but never 
informed me of the results. I got a report from Instacare on their EKG: abnormal 
R progression, .... 
I hope that after next week, some of the stress will lessen, and maybe I'll 
start feeling better again, at least my mood. If you think I should change my 
medication doseage, please give me a call. 
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Unless I hear otherwise, I'll continue the prozac according to our last 
discussion, and see you on June 4th, at 2:00 P.M. 
Sincerely, 
William P. Barron, Jr. 
611 Park St. #14 




Bishop Duane S. Smith 
Dr. Kevin Walsh, MD [Intermountain Clinic] 
Dr. Steven R. Towner, MD [Salt Lake Clinic] 
AGENT ORANGE VETERAN PAYMENT PROGRAM 
Attending Physician's Statement 
To be completed for every veteran applying for a disability payment. 
i
^
n2M^mLwww4tmmidmcWM&SM!&mt'- . ' jn-« Part A. Patient (Vetemn)4pformamm^^^^^^^^^^^^m:%miM 
(To be completed by the veteran) ^ C O ^ V — • 
Patient's 
N a m e BARRON, WILLIAM PAUL JR. Q n r ^ ^ /2_/S_/2_N±/4_N3_/J_/^_/0_/ 
(Last) (First) (Middle) 
Address 611 South Park St. #14,* Sal t Lake Ci ty UT 84102 Birth Date /j_/23/_48 
Street City State ZIP Mo. DayYr. 
Are you presently receiving Social Security Disability Income Payments or Supplemental Security Income? 
/ / yes fSZJ no S S I discontinued a f te r awar* of CSA Disabi l i ty annuity 
Federal C i v i l Service 
Important: After you have completed Part A, send this form and the pre-addressed envelope from your Appli-
cation Kit to your physician. Ask him or her to complete Part B of this Attending Physician's Statement as 
soon as possible and return it to: 
THE AGENT ORANGE VETERAN PAYMENT PROGRAM 
P.O. BOX 110 
HARTFORD, CT 06104 
I Part B. Physician Information * J ^ 
(To be completed by the veteran's (patient's) physician ONLY) 
Notice to Physicians: 
Your patient (the veteran named above) has filed an Application for Disability Payments under the AGENT 
ORANGE VETERAN PAYMENT PROGRAM. To qualify for payments, your patient must demonstrate 'total 
disability" as defined by the Social Security Act. 
In order to evaluate this veteran's application, we need information from you regarding the diagnosis, history, 
present condition, and treatment of your patient's disability. We cannot begin that evaluation until we receive 
this Attending Physician's Statement from you. 
If your patient has answered "yes" above to indicate that he or she is receiving Social Security Disability 
Income, you need only complete Section 1 - Diagnosis, and Section 11- Signature. 
If your patient has answered "no" above, please complete the entire inside of this form, 
Sections 1-11. 
If you have any questions while completing this form, please call the AGENT ORANGE VETERAN 
PAYMENT PROGRAM toll-free at 1 (800) 225-4712. 
After you have completed this Statement, please place it in the pre-addressed envelope your patient 
should have provided you, and mail it as soon as possible to the address shown above. 
Thank you. 
Part B. (Continued) 
Reminder: If your patient answered "yes" in Part A on the front cover, complete only Sections 1 and 11. If 
your patient answered "no", complete all Sections. 
1. DIAGNOSIS/DIAGNOSES 
(a) When did you last examine the patient? lj4jJd$8J 
Mo. Day Yr. 
(b) Your diagnosis (including any complications) y*lQ.(<y<Z O f f f i c ^ / o A / R€cuRR&JT 
(c) Subjective symptoms (describe the disease) "^eKUfrd/* * t <M/GW 
(d) Is condition due to accidental, self-inflicted or traumatic injury? 
£</ no 




(a) When did symptoms first appear or accident happen? i'_/_/%& (Please list dates for various 
diagnoses, if appropriate.) Mo. Day Yr. 
(b) When did patient cease work because of disability? l£l /SU 
(c) Has patient ever had same or similar condition? Md. Day Yr. 
/JCj no / / yes If "yes" state when and describe. 
(d) Objective findings (including current X-rays, EKG's, laboratory data and clinical findings) 
(e) Names and addresses of other treating physicians 
3. DATES OF TREATMENT 
(a) Date of first visit iJjQV] (b) Date of last visit /JV/JP/*?/ 
Mo. Day Yr. Mo. Day Yr. 
(c) Frequency /__/ Weekly /£/ Monthly /_/ Other (Specify) 
(d) Is patient still under your care for this condition(s)? 
ifi yes 
/_/ no If "no," indicate date service terminated. / _ / _ / _ / 
Mo. Day Yr. 
4. NATURE OF TREATMENT (Including surgery and medications prescribed, if any) 
KUnr\fc § V * \ O.S ^ V 
5. PROGRESS 
(a) Has patient /_/Recovered? /_/Improved? / # Stabilized? /_/Retrogressed? 
(b) Is patient /£/ Ambulatory? /_/House confined? /_/ Bed confined? /_/Hospital confined? 
(c) Has patient been hospital confined? 
1)0 no /_/ yes If "yes," give Name and Address of Hospital 
Confined from /_/_/__/ through /__/_/__/ 
Mo. Day Yr. Mo. Day Yr. 
If hospitalization has occurred at multiple facilities, please list them on a separate sheet of paper. 
6. CARDIAC 
(If Applicable) 
(a) Functional Capacity Class 1 (No limitation) /_/ 
(American Heart Assoc.) Class 2 (Slight limitation) /_/ 
Class 3 (Marked limitation) /_/ 
Class 4 (Complete limitation) /_/ 
(b) Blood Pressure (last visit) / 
Systolic Diastolic 
7. LIMITATIONS 
(a) What are patient's present capabilities? 
(b) What are patient's present limitations (physical and/or mental)? f • * - j 
(c) What restrictions are placed oh patient? * 0 
8. PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT 
(as defined in Federal Dictionary of Occupational Titles) 
/_/ Class 1 -No limitation of functional capacity; capable of heavy work; no restrictions. (1-10%) 
/_/ Class 2 -Medium manual activity. (15-30%) 
/__/ Class 3 - Slight limitations of functional capacity; capable of light work. (35-55%) 
/__/ Class 4 - Moderate limitation of functional capacity; capable of clerical/ administrative (sedentary) 
activity. (60-70%) 
I)(J Class 5 - Severe limitation of functional capacity; incapable of minimal (sedentary) activity. 
(75-100%) 
/_./ Remarks: 
9. MENTAL / NERVOUS IMPAIRMENT 
(if applicable) 
(a) What is impact of stress on patient's daily activities? 
(b) What stress and problems in interpersonal relations has patient experienced? 
/_/ Class 1 - Patient is able to function under stress and engage in interpersonal relations (no 
limitation). 
I J Class 2 - Patient is able to function in most stress situations and engage in most interpersonal 
relations (slight limitations). 
I J Class 3 - Patient is able to engage in only limited stress situations and engage in only limited 
interpersonal relations (moderate limitations). 
Ijgl Class 4 - Patient is unable to engage in stress situations or engage in interpersonal relations 
(marked limitations). 
/_/ Class 5 - Patient has significant loss of psychological, physiological, personal ana social 
adjustment (severe limitations). 
/ / Remarks: 
10. PROGNOSIS 
(a) What is the patient's prognosis? Specify a prognosis for each of the various diagnoses 
listed. Use a separate sheet if necessary. /Jo ( ^ y w v f r ^ ^ AuAfy^fa^ 
(b) How long from now do you feel patient's maximum medical improvement will be reached? 
/_/ 3 months /_/ 6 months /_/1 year /_/ longer /£/ no improvement expected 
11. SIGNATURE 
(Print) 
Name of Attending Physician Degree Specialty Telephone 
Street Address City or Town State or Province Zip Code 
H 1TTI<SC£^ ft. deuru^ S*2 *fc*M 
Signature ^ Date 
APPENDIX K 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
[CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES] 
SET OUT VERBATIM 
Rule 3 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
gal claims. Columbia Trust Co. v. Anglum, 63 
Utah 353, 225 P. 1089 (1924). 
—Relief granted. 
Court could administer relief according to 
nature of cause, whether it would have been 
granted in equity or at law. Morgan v. Child, 
Cole & Co., 47 Utah 417, 155 P. 451 (1916); 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Actions § 30. 
C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Actions §§ 55 to 57. 
Key Numbers. — Action «=» 22 to 25. 
Advisory Committee Note. — Rule 3 con-
stitutes a significant change from the prior 
rule. The rule retains service of the ten-day 
summons as one of two means to commence an 
action, but the rule requires that the summons 
together with a copy of the complaint be served 
on the defendant pursuant to Rule 4. In so do-
ing, the rule eliminates the requirement that a 
copy of the complaint be deposited with the 
clerk for the defendant whose address is un-
known. The changes in Rule 3 must be read 
and should be interpreted in conjunction with 
coordinate changes in Rule 4 and with a 
change in Rule 12(a) that begins the running 
of the defendant's 20-day response time from 
the service of the summons and complaint. 
Paragraph (a). This paragraph eliminates 
the requirement that a copy of the complaint 
be deposited with the clerk for the defendant 
Jenkins v. Nicolas, 63 Utah 329, 226 P. 177 
(1924); Trenchard v. Reay, 70 Utah 19, 257 P. 
1046 (1927); Wasatch Oil Ref. Co. v. Wade, 92 
Utah 50, 63 P.2d 1070 (1936). 
Cited in Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 
(Utah 1987). 
whose address is unknown. Paragraph (b) of 
the former rule, which permitted the plaintiff 
to deposit copies of the complaint with the 
clerk for defendants not otherwise served with 
a copy at the time of the service of the sum-
mons, has also been eliminated. The rule re-
quires, in effect, that both the summons and 
the complaint be served pursuant to Rule 4. 
Under a coordinate change in Rule 12(a), the 
defendant's time for answering or otherwise re-
sponding to the complaint does not begin to 
run until service of the summons and com-
plaint pursuant to Rule 4. 
Paragraph (b). This paragraph is substan-
tially identical to paragraph (c) of the former 
rule. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment in Subdivision (a) inserted "together with 
a copy of the complaint in accordance with 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
PART II. 
COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION; SERVICE OF 
PROCESS, PLEADINGS, MOTIONS AND 
ORDERS. 
Rule 3. Commencement of action. 
(a) How commenced. A civil action is commenced (1) by filing a complaint 
with the court, or (2) by service of a summons together with a copy of the 
complaint in accordance with Rule 4. If the action is commenced by the service 
of a summons and a copy of the complaint, then the complaint, the summons 
and proof of service, must be filed within ten days of such service. If, in a case 
commenced under paragraph (a)(2) of this rule, the complaint, summons and 
proof of service are not filed within ten days of service, the action commenced 
shall be deemed dismissed and the court shall have no further jurisdiction 
thereof; provided, however, that the foregoing provision shall not change the 
requirement of Utah Code Ann. Section 12-1-8 (1986). 
(b) Time of jurisdiction. The court shall have jurisdiction from the time of 
filing of the complaint or service of the summons and a copy of the complaint. 
(Amended effective April 1, 1990.) 
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between title of the summons and the title of Cited in State v. Judd, 27 Utah 2d 79, 493 
the complaint was not a proper basis to set P.2d 604 (1972); State v. Poteet, 692 P.2d 760 
aside default judgment granted by trial court (Utah 1984); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P 2d 245 
Bawden & Assocs v. Smith, 624 P.2d 676 (Utah 1988); Phillips v. Smith, 768 P.2d 449 
(Utah 1981). (Utah 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jur 2d Courts C.J.S. — 21 C.J.S. Courts § 80; 71 C.J.S 
§ 143; 61A Am. Jur 2d Pleading §§ 350 to Pleading §§ 408 to 412, 72 C.J.S Process § 3 
352; 62 Am Jur 2d Process § 5. Key Numbers. — Courts <s= 21 et seq.; 
Pleading <^=> 331; Process «=» 4 to 6. 
Rule 4. Process. 
(a) Signing of summons. The summons shall be signed and issued by the 
plaintiff or the plaintiffs attorney. Separate summonses may be signed and 
served. 
(b) Time of service. In an action commenced under Rule 3(a)(1), the sum-
mons together with a copy of the complaint shall be served no later than 120 
days after the filing of the complaint unless the court allows a longer period of 
time for good cause shown. If the summons and complaint are not timely 
served, the action shall be dismissed, without prejudice on application of any 
party or upon the court's own initiative. In any action brought against two or 
more defendants on which service has been obtained upon one of them within 
the 120 days or such longer period as may be allowed by the court, the other or 
others may be served or appear at any time prior to trial. 
(c) Contents of summons. The summons shall contain the name of the 
court, the address of the court, the names of the parties to the action, and the 
county in which it is brought. It shall be directed to the defendant, state the 
name, address and telephone number of the plaintiffs attorney, if any, and 
otherwise the plaintiffs address and telephone number. It shall state the time 
within which the defendant is required to answer the complaint in writing, 
and shall notify the defendant that in case of failure to do so, judgment by 
default will be rendered against the defendant. It shall state either that the 
complaint is on file with the court or that the complaint will be filed with the 
court within ten days of service. If service is made by publication, the sum-
mons shall briefly state the subject matter and the sum of money or other 
relief demanded, and that the complaint is on file. 
(d) By whom served. The summons and complaint may be served in this 
state or any other state or territory of the United States, by the sheriff or 
constable, or by the deputy of either, by a United States Marshal or by the 
marshal's deputy, or by any other person 18 years of age or older at the time of 
service, and not a party to the action or a party's attorney. 
(e) Personal service. Personal service shall be made as follows: 
(1) Upon any individual other than one covered by subparagraphs (2), 
(3) or (4) below, by delivering a copy of the summons and/or the complaint 
to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual's 
dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age 
and discretion there residing, or by delivering a copy of the summons 
and/or the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to 
receive service of process; 
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Prayer for relief 
—New trial 
Particulanzation 






Prayer for relief. 
Although a trial court ma\ den^ a motion to 
amend the complaint for a movant's failure to 
present a written motion and a proposed 
amended complaint, that rule does not apply to 
the prayer for relief because, under Rule 54(c), 
the prayer does not limit the relief which the 
court may grant Behrens v Raleigh Hills 
Hosp, 675 P 2 d 1179 (Utah 1983) 
—New trial. 
Particularization. 
Only purpose for requiring particulanzation 
of grounds for motion for new trial is to inform 
court and other party of theories upon which 
new trial is sought, where defendant filed affi-
davit with motions setting forth theories, and 
judgment had been on pleadings, court and 
parties were sufficiently advised as to grounds 
for motion Howard v Howard, 11 Utah 2d 
149, 356 P 2 d 275 (1960) 
—Setting aside conditional order. 
Where court on own initiative lowered from 
$2,000 to $1,000 value of building as found by 
jur> and entered conditional order granting 
new trial unless plaintiff consented to reduc-
tion, court could restore jury findings under 
authonU of this Rule, since plaintiff filed mo-
tion to set aside conditional order for new trial 
within ten days National Farmers' Union 
Propertv & Cas Co v Thompson, 4 Utah 2d 7, 
286 P2d 249, 61 A L.R 2d 635 (1955) 
Orders. 
—Correct ion. 
Where judge made perfunctory or clerical 
mistake resulting from erroneous assumption 
that order prepared by counsel correctly re-
flected judgment of Supreme Court and trial 
court, judge could correct order on his own mo-
tion Meagher v Equity Oil Co , 5 Utah 2d 196, 
299 P2d 827 (1956) 
Cited in Boskovich v Utah Constr Co., 123 
Utah 387, 259 P 2d 885 (1953), Thomas v 
Heirs of Braffet, 6 Utah 2d 57, 305 P.2d 507 
(1956) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 56 Am J u r 2d Motions, 
Rules, and Orders ^ 1 et seq , 61A Am J u r 2d 
Pleading §§ 1 et seq , 238 
C.J.S. — 60 C J S Motions and Orders § 1 
et seq , 71 C J S Pleading §* 63 tc 210, 140 et 
seq , 211 et seq 
A.L.R. — Proceeding for summery judgment 
as affected bv presentation of counterclaim, 8 
A L R 3 d 1361 
Right to voluntary dismissal of civil action 
as affected by opponent's motion for summary 
judgment, judgment on the pleadings, or di-
rected verdict, 36 A L.R 3d 1113 
Key Numbers. — Motions «= 1 et seq.; 
Pleading «=» 381
 2 to 186, 187 et seq 
Rule 8. General rules of pleadings. 
(a) Claims for relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, 
whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, 
shall contain (Da short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief: and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief to 
which he deems himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several differ-
ent types may be demanded. 
(b) Defenses; form of denials. A party shall state in short and plain terms 
his defenses to each claim asserted and shall admit or deny the averments 
upon which the adverse party relies. If he is without knowledge or informa-
tion sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of an averment, he shall so state 
and this has the effect of a denial. Denials shall fairly meet the substance of 
the averments denied When a pleader intends in good faith to deny only a 
22 
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part or a qualification of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true 
and material and shall deny only the remainder. Unless the pleader intends 
in good faith to controvert all the averments of the preceding pleading, he 
may make his denials as specific denials of designated averments or para-
graphs, or he may generally deny all the averments except such designated 
averments or paragraphs as he expressly admits; but, when he does so intend 
to controvert all its averments, he may do so by general denial subject to the 
obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party 
shall set forth affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow servant, 
laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of frauds, statute of 
limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affir-
mative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a coun-
terclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so 
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper designation. 
(d) Effect of failure to deny. Averments in a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is required, other than those as to the amount of damage, are 
admitted when not denied in the responsive pleading. Averments in a plead-
ing to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted shall be taken as 
denied or avoided. 
(e) Pleading to be concise and direct; consistency. 
(1) Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No 
technical forms of pleading or motions are required. 
(2) A party may set forth two or more statements of a claim or defense 
alternately or hypothetically, either in one count or defense or in separate 
counts or defenses. When two or more statements are made in the alter-
native and one of them if made independently would be sufficient, the 
pleading is not made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or more of the 
alternative statements. A party may also state as many separate claims 
or defenses as he has regardless of consistency and whether based on legal 
or on equitable grounds or on both. All statements shall be made subject 
to the obligations set forth in Rule 11. 
(f) Construction of pleadings. All pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan- Forms of answers, Forms 21, 22. 
tially the same as Rule 8, F.R.C.P. Hearing of certain defenses before trial, Rule 
Cross-References. — Amended and supple- 12<d). 
mental pleadings, Rule 15. Interpleader, Rule 22. 
Arbitration, § 78-31a-l et seq. Motions, forms for, Forms 20, 23, 24. 
Comparative negligence, § 78-27-38. Numbered paragraphs, Rule 10(b). 
Counterclaim and cross-claim, Rule 13. One form of action. Rule 2. 
Creditors, assignment for benefit of, § 6-1-1 Reply to answer, order for, Rule 7(a). 
et seq. Security interest, enforceability of, 
Defenses and objections, Rule 12. § 70A-9-203. 
Fee for filing cross-claim or counterclaim, Special forms of pleadings and writs abol-
§§ 78-3-16.5, 78-4-24, 78-6-14; Appx. G, Code ished, Rule 65B(a). 
of Judicial Administration. Statute of frauds, generally, $ 25-5-1 et seq. 
Fellow servant defined. § 34-25-2. Statute of frauds, investment securities, 
Form of pleadings, Rule 10. § 70A-8-319. 
Forms intended to indicate simplicity and Statute of frauds, sales, § 70A-2-201. 
brevity of statement, Rule 84. Statute of frauds, Uniform Commercial 
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tStCtitor or administrator of plaintiff who pro- Libel and Slander «=» 77 et seq., 90 et seq.; Lim-
hm*A to bring the action in that capacity with- itation of Actions <s=> 183; Parties «=» 72 to 74; 
OUt previous valid appointment, 27 A.L.R.4th Pleading <s=> 8(1), (9), (13), (14), (15), (16), (18), 
|98. 14, 32. 39, 46. 59, 63; Quieting Title <s=> 34(3); 
Key Numbers. — Associations <£=> 20(5); Statutes «=» 280. 
Corporations «= 513(4), 514; Damages *=» 142; 
Rule 10. Form of pleadings and other papers. 
(a) Caption; names of parties; other necessary information. All plead-
ings and other papers filed with the court shall contain a caption setting forth 
the name of the court, the title of the action, the file number, the name of the 
pleading or other paper, and the name, if known, of the judge to whom the 
case is assigned. In the complaint, the title of the action shall include the 
names of all the parties, but other pleadings and papers need only state the 
name of the first party on each side with an .indication that there are other 
parties. A party whose name is not knowrn shall be designated by any name 
and the words "whose true name is unknown." In an action in rem, unknown 
parties shall be designated as "all unknown persons who claim any interest in 
the subject matter of the action." Every pleading and other paper filed with 
the court shall also state the name, address, telephone number and bar num-
ber of any attorney representing the party filing the paper, which information 
shall appear in the top left-hand corner of the first page. Every pleading shall 
state the name and address of the party for whom it is filed; this information 
shall appear in the lower left-hand corner of the last page of the pleading. 
(b) Paragraphs; separate statements. All averments of claim or defense 
shall be made in numbered paragraphs, the contents of each of which shall be 
limited as far as practicable to a statement of a single set of circumstances; 
and a paragraph may be referred to by number in all succeeding pleadings. 
Each claim founded upon a separate transaction or occurrence and each de-
fense other than denials shall be stated in a separate count or defense when-
ever a separation facilitates the clear presentation of the matters set forth. 
(c) Adoption by reference; exhibits. Statements in a pleading may be 
adopted by reference in a different part of the same pleading or in another 
pleading, or in any motion. An exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all 
purposes. 
(d) Paper quality, size, style and printing. All pleadings and other pa-
pers filed with the court, except printed documents or other exhibits, shall be 
typewritten, printed or photocopied in black type on good, white, unglazed 
paper of letter size (8 ll{ x 11"), with a top margin of not less than 2 inches 
above any typed material, a left-hand margin of not less than 1 inch, a right-
hand margin of not less than one-half inch, and a bottom margin of not less 
than one-half inch. All typing or printing shall be clearly legible, shall be 
double-spaced, except for matters customarily single-spaced or indented, and 
shall not be smaller than pica size. Typing or printing shall appear on one side 
of the page only. 
(e) Signature line. Names shall be typed or printed under all signature 
lines, and all signatures shall be made in permanent black or blue ink. 
(0 Enforcement by clerk; waiver for pro se parties. The clerk of the 
court shall examine all pleadings and other papers filed with the court. If they 
are not prepared in conformity with this rule, the clerk shall accept the filing 
but may require counsel to substitute properly prepared papers for noncon-
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forming papers. The clerk or the court may waive the requirements of this 
rule for parties appearing pro se. For good cause shown, the court may relieve 
any party of any requirement of this rule. 
(g) Replacing lost pleadings or papers. If an original pleading or paper 
filed in any action or proceeding is lost, the court may, upon motion, with or 
without notice, authorize a copy thereof to be filed and used in lieu of the 
original. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1983; April 1, 1990.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — As a general 
matter. Rule 10 deals with the form of papers 
filed with the court — both "pleadings" as de-
fined in Rule 7(a) and "other papers filed with 
the court," including motions, memoranda, dis-
cover}' responses, and orders. The changes in 
the present rule were promulgated to clarify 
ambiguities in the prior rule and to address 
specific problems encountered by the courts. 
Paragraphs (b), <c> and «e» of the rule were not 
changed, except that paragraph (e) was redes-
ignated as (g) and new paragraphs (e) and (f) 
were added. 
Paragraph (a). This paragraph specifies re-
quirements for captions in every paper filed 
with the court. In addition to the other require-
ments, the caption must contain the name of 
the judge to whom the case is assigned, if the 
judge's name is known at the time the paper is 
filed. In the top left-hand corner of the first 
page, each paper must state identifying infor-
mation concerning the attorney representing 
the party filing the paper. Finally, every plead-
ing must state the name and current address of 
the party for whom it is filed; this information 
should appear on the lower left-hand corner of 
the last page. This information need not be set 
forth in papers other than pleadings. 
Paragraph (d). The changes in this para-
graph make it clear that papers filed with the 
court must be "typewritten, printed or photo-
copied in black type." The Advisory Committee 
considered suggestions from different groups 
that so-called "dot matrix" printing be specifi-
cally allowed or specifically prohibited. The 
Advisory Committee, however, settled on the 
requirements that "typing or printing shall be 
clearly legible .. . and shall not be smaller than 
pica size." If typing or printing on papers filed 
with the court complies with these standards, 
the papers should not be deemed to violate the 
rule merely because they were prepared in a 
dot matrix printer. As currently written, this 
paragraph also removes any confusion concern-
ing the top margin and left margin require-
ments (now 2 inches and 1 inch respectively), 
and this paragraph imposes new requirements 
for right and bottom margins (both one-half 
inch). 
Paragraph (e>. This paragraph, which is an 
addition to the rule, requires typed signature 
lines and signatures in permanent black or 
blue ink. 
Paragraph (f). The changes in this para-
graph make it clear that the clerk must accept 
all papers for filing, even though they may vio-
late the rule, but the clerk may require counsel 
to substitute conforming for nonconforming pa-
pers. The clerk is given discretion to waive re-
quirements of the rule for parties who are not 
represented by counsel; for good cause shown, 
the court may relieve parties of the obligation 
to comply with the rule or any part of it. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment added "and other papers" to the rule 
catchline and added similar language in two 
places in Subdivision (a); in Subdivision (a), 
added the last phrase in the subdivision head-
ing, added the last two phrases in the first sen-
tence, deleting "and a designation as in Rule 
(7Ma)," added the last two sentences, and made 
stylistic changes; rewrote Subdivision (d); 
added Subdivisions (e) and (f); and redesig-
nated former Subdivision (e) as Subdivision 
(g). 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 10, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Exhibits. 
—Use as pleadings. 
Cited. 
Exhibits. 
—Use as pleadings. 
While an exhibit may be considered as a part 
of a pleading to clarify or explain the same, an 
exhibit to a pleading cannot serve the purpose 
of supplying necessary material averments nor 
can the content of the exhibit be taken as part 
of the allegations of the pleading itself. Girard 
v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983). 
Cited in State ex rel. Cannon v. Leary, 646 
P.2d 727 (Utah 1982). 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading A.L.R. — Propriety of attaching photo-
§§ 23 to 56, 69, 117. graphs to a pleading, 33 A.L.R.3d 322. 
C.J.S. — 71 C.J.S. Pleading §§ 5, 9, 63 to 98, Key Numbers. — Pleading <s=> 4. 13, 15, 38V2 
371 to 375, 418. to 75, 307 to 312, 340. 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attor-
ney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name 
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address 
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign 
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when other-
wise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or 
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer 
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one 
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature 
of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(Amended, effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is substan-
tially similar to Rule 11, F.R.C.P. 
ANALYSIS 
Amendment of complaint. 
Violation. 
—Question of law. 
—Sanctions. 
Cited. 
Amendment of complaint. 
Amendment by an attorney of the facts 
stated in a complaint was sufficient to estab-
lish those facts as they would have been by a 
verified complaint before the changes made by 
this rule making verification unnecessary. 
Calder v. Third Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. Salt 
Lake County, 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168 
(1954). 
Violation. 
—Question of law. - » 
Whether specific conduct amounts to a viola- ' 
tion of this rule is a question of law. Taylor v. ( 
Estate of Tavlor, 770 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. j 
1989). —^ 
—Sanctions. 
This rule gives trial courts great leeway to 
tailor the sanction to fit the requirements of 
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Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of 
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or 
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismis-
sal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless other-
wise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is with-
out prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any 
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this 
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions 
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defen-
dant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the 
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the 
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the 
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this 
paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, 
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation 
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in 
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground 
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The 
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of 
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indis-
pensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The 
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third-party claim. A voluntary7 dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to 
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at 
the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once 
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including 
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order 
for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem 
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the nlaintiff has 
complied with the order. 
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instructions Morgan v Quailbrook Condomin-
nim Co, 704 P2d 573 (Utah 1985) 
Written instructions. 
—Failure to tender. 
Waiver. 
Where plaintiff had failed to tender a writ-
ten instruction on burden of proof he could not 
claim error in the lack of such instruction Ful-
ler v Zinik Sporting Goods Co , 538 P 2d 1036 
(Utah 1975) 
Cited in Wellman v Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 
366 P 2d 701 (1961), Hill v Cloward, 14 Utah 
2d 55, 377 P 2d 186 (1962), Ortega v Thomas, 
14 Utah 2d 296, 383 P 2d 406 (1963), Meier v 
Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P 2d 734 
(1964), Memmott v United States Fuel Co , 22 
Utah 2d 356, 453 P2d 155 (1969), Telford v 
Newell J Olsen & Sons Constr Co 25 Utah 
2d 270, 480 P 2d 462 (1971), Flynn v WP 
Harhn Constr Co , 29 Utah 2d 327 509 P 2d 
356 (1973), McGinn v Utah Power & Light 
Co, 529 P 2d 423 (Utah 1974), Henderson v 
Meyer, 533 P 2d 290 (Utah 1975), Lamkin v 
Lynch, 600 P 2d 530 (Utah 1979), State v Hall, 
671 P 2d 201 (Utah 1983), Highland Constr 
Co v Union Pac R R, 683 P 2d 1042 (Utah 
1984), Gill v Timm, 720 P 2d 1352 (Utah 
1986), Pem-od v Carter, 737 P 2d 199 (Utah 
1987), Kng v Fereday, 739 P 2d 618 (Utah 
1987), State v Cox, 751 P 2d 1152 (Utah Ct 
App 1988), Ramon ex rel Ramon v Farr, 770 
P2d 131 'Utah 1989) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 75 Am Jur 2d Trial § 573 
et seq 
C.J.S. — 88 C J S Trial §§ 266 to 448 
A.L.R. — Propriety and prejudicial effect of 
instructions in civil case as affected by the 
manner in which they are written, 10 A L R 3d 
501 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove future pain and suffering and 
to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
ALR3d 10 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove impairment of earning capac-
ity and to warrant instructions to jury thereon, 
18 A L R 3d 88 
Sufficiency of evidence, in personal injury 
action, to prove permanence of injuries and to 
warrant instructions to jury thereon, 18 
ALR3d 170 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20 
ALR3d 1081 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case 
stressing desirability and importance of agree-
ment, 38 ALR3d 1281 
Verdict urging instructions in civil case 
commenting on weight of majority view or au-
thorizing compromise, 41 A L R 3d 845 
Verdict-urging instructions in civil case ad-
monishing jurors to refrain from intransigence 
or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju-
rors, 41 ALR3d 1154 
Construction of statutes or rules making 
mandatory the use of pattern or uniform ap-
proved jury instructions, 49 A L R 3d 128 
Necessity and propriety of instructing on al-
ternative theories of negligence or breach of 
warranty, where instruction on strict liability 
in tort is given in products liability case, 52 
ALR3d 102 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure construc-
tion and effect of provision in Rule 51 and sim-
ilar state rules, that counsel be given opportu-
nity to make objections to instructions out of 
hearing of jury, 1 ALR Fed 310 
Key Numbers. — Trial «* 182 to 296 
Rule 52. Findings by the court, 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 
58A, in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi-
larly set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of 
review Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given 
to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses 
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be 
considered as the findings of the court It will be sufficient if the findings of 
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fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court follow-
ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and 
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 4Kb). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement of thP grrmnd for it-g 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56^3X1^32 
wlfen the motion is based on more than one ground. 
~(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made nbTiafer than 10 days after 
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional find-
ings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion may be made with 
a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made 
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not 
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judg-
ment, or a motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions 
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the 
parties to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend-
ment, in Subdivision (a), deleted "and" preced-
ing "in granting" in the first sentence, inserted 
the third and fifth sentences, rewrote the sixth 
sentence and added the last sentence. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 52, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Masters, Rule 53. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Adoption. 
—Abandonment of contract. 
—Advisory verdict. 
—Breach of contract. 
—Child custody. 
—Contempt. 
—Credibility of witnesses. 
—Denial of motion. 






—Submission by prevailing party. 
Court's discretion. 
—Water dispute. 
Findings of state engineer. 
Amendment. 
—Motion. 
Conformance with original findings. 
New trial. 
Notice of appeal. 
Time. 
Tolling of appeal period. 
When made. 
—Overruling or vacation. 
Another district judge. 
Lack of notice. 
Child custody awards. 
Criminal cases. 
Effect. 
—Preclusion of summary judgment. 
Failure to object to findings. 
How findings entered. 
Judicial review. 
—Standard of review. 
Conclusions of law. 
Criminal trials. 
Findings of facts by jury. 
Juvenile proceedings. 
Purpose of rule. 
Stipulations. 
Sufficiency. 
—Allegations of pleadings. 
—Burden on appeal. 
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
lav; or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors. 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial. 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment. 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit. Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation. The court may permit reply affidavits. 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. of verdict or indictment, Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion Rule 606. 
for new trial, § 21-2-2. 
Harmless error not ground for new trial, 
Rule 61. 
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Propriety and prejudicial effect of suggestion case, or with partner or associate of such attor-
or comments by judge as to compromise or set- ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 
tlement of civil case, 6 A.L.R.3d 1457 A.L.R.3d 126. 
Necessity and propriety of counter-affidavits Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
in opposition to motion for new trial in civil ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion 
case, 7 A.L.R.3d 1000.
 m a ( j e in due time, 69 A.L.R.3d 845. 
Quotient verdicts, 8 A.L.R.3d 335. Authority of state court to order jury trial in 
Propriety and prejudicial effect of instruc-
 c i v i l c a s e w h e r e J u r v h a s b e e n w a i v e d o r n o t 
tions in civil case as affected by the manner in
 d e m a n d e d bv parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. 
which they are written. 10 A.L.R.Sd 501. Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching 
Prejudicial effect of unauthorized view by , . . . . , . 
. .,
 r r . , A
 J
 verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on * jury in civil case of scene of accident or prem- ,
 n o A T ^ °, . , _ A 
ises in question, 11 A.L.R.3d 918. a P P e a l ' 3 8 , A 1 R - 4 t h n™' 
Propnetv and prejudicial effect of reference ^ . ^ waiver as binding on later state 
by counsel in civil case to result of former trial C1™ t n a L 4 8 A.L.R.4th 747. 
of same case, or amount of verdict therein. 15 C o u r t reporter's death or disability prior to 
A.L.R.3d 1101. transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
Absence of judge from courtoom during trial n e w trial, 57 A.L.R.4th 1049. 
of civil case. 25 A.L.R.3d 637. Key N u m b e r s . — New Trial «=» 13 et seq.. 
Juror 's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of 110, 116. 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice^ relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3).fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action: (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shallTTe^made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
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Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim Utah Rules of Evi-
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983 1985 Utah L Rev 63, 73 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and consolidates the 
law of judicial notice formerly contained in 
Rules 9 through 12, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(197H and in Utah Code Annotated, § 78-24-1 
[78-25-1] (1953) [superseded b> this rule] into 
one broadly defined rule The Utah Supreme 
Court has stated the rule with reference to ju-
dicial notice in Little Cottonwood Water Co v 
Kimball, 76 Utah 243, 267, 289 Pac 116 (1930) 
where the court stated "In short, a court is 
presumed to know what every man of ordinary 
intelligence must know about such things " 
See also DeFusion Co v Utah Liquor Control 
Comm'n, 613 P 2d 1120 (Utah 1980) 
Subdivision (a) "governs only judicial notice 
of adjudicative facts," and does not deal with 
instances in which a court may notice legisla-
tive facts, which is left to the sound discretion 
of trial and appellate courts Compare Rule 12, 
dence (1971) was not as specific, but Rule 106 
is otherwise m accord with Utah practice 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) Since legisla-
tive facts are matters that go to the policy of a 
rule of law as distinct from the true facts that 
are used in the adjudication of a controversy 
they are not appropriate for a rule of evidence 
and best left to the law-making considerations 
by appellate and trial courts 
Subdivision (b) is in accord with the Little 
Cottonwood Water Co case, supra, and the 
substance of Rule 9(1) and (2), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971) Utah law presumes that the 
law of another jurisdiction is the same as that 
of the State of Utah and judicial notice has 
been taken from the law of other states and 
foreign countries Lamberth v Lamberth, 550 
P2d 200 (Utah 1976), Maple v Maple, 566 
P2d 1229 (Utah 1977) The Utah court has 
taken judicial notice under Rule 9(2), UtaD 
Rules of Evidence (1971) of the rules and regu-




Rule 201. Judicial notice of adjudicative facts. 
(a) Scope of rule. This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative 
facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to 
reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determi-
nation by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. A court may take judicial notice, whether re-
quested or not. 
(d) When mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice if requested by a 
party and supplied with the necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. A party is entitled upon timely request to an 
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking judicial notice and the 
tenor of the matter noticed. In the absence of prior notification, the request 
may be made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding. 
(g) Instructing jury. In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall in-
struct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. In a criminal 
case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to, accept 
as conclusive any fact judicially noticed. 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
cess right to a fair trial State v Fulton, 742 
P 2d 1208 (Utah 1987). cert denied, — U S — , 
108 S Ct 777, 98 L Ed 2d 864 (1988) 
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evi-
dence 1983, 1985 Utah L Rev 63, 66 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Com-
ment, Victims of Child Sexual Abuse in the 
Courtroom New Utah Rules and Their Consti-
tutional Implications, 15 J Contemp L 81 
(1989) 
A.L.R. — Admissibility of affidavit to im-
peach witness, 14 A L R 4th 828 
Admissibility of testimony regarding sponta-
neous declarations made by one incompetent to 
testify at trial, 15 A L R 4th 1043 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 





This rule merely requires that the witness 
have had the opportunity and the capacity to 
Utah Law Review. — Note. Hypnosis and 
the Defendant's Right to Testify in a Criminal 
Case. 1989 Utah L Rev 545 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim The oath or affirma-
tion need not be in any special form but only 
such as to awaken the conscience of the wit-
ness and impress the witness with the duty to 
Instructions to jury as to credibility of child's 
testimony in criminal case, 32 A L R 4th 1196 
Deaf-mute as witness, 50 A L R 4th 1188 
Dead man's statutes as affected by Rule 601 
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence and similar 
state rules, 50 A.L R 4th 1238 
Contingent fee informant testimony in state 
prosecutions, 57 A L R 4th 643 
Witnesses- child competency statutes, 60 
A.L R 4th 369 
substance of Rule 10 [Rule 19], Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). 
perceive the events in question Testimony of a 
witness need not be excluded if the witness's 
memory of 1 he subject matter of the testimony 
is less than complete State v Eldredge, 773 
P 2d 29 (Utah 1989) 
Cited in State v Jones, 656 P 2d 1012 (Utah 
1982) 
testify truthfully The rule is a modified ver-
sion of Rule 18, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) 
Cross-References. — Administration and 
form of oath or affirmation. ^ 78-7-17, 
78-24-16 to 78-24-19 
Rule 602. Lack of personal knowledge. 
A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced suffi-
cient to support a finding that he has personal knowledge of the matter. 
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not, consist of the testi-
mony of the witness himself. This rule is subject to the provisions of Rule 703, 
relating to opinion testimony by expert witnesses. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 603. Oath or affirmation. 
Before testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he will 
testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to 
awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so. 
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ARTICLE VII. 
OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
jlule 701. Opinion testimony by lay witnesses. 
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of 
opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) 
rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear 
miderstanding of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantially 
the same as Rule 19, Utah Rules of Evidence 
ANALYSIS 
Pregnancy 
Relation to expert testimony 
Pregnancy. 
The admission of a mother's testimony on 
the subject of gestation period of her pregnancy 
was not error Roods v Roods, 645 P 2d 640 
(Utah 1982) 
A.L.R. — Ability to see, hear, smell, or oth-
erwise sense, as proper subject of opinion by 
lay witness, 10 A L R 3d 258 
Competency of nonexpert's testimony based 
on sound alone as to speed of motor vehicle 
involved in accident, 33 A L R 3d 1405 
Admissibility of nonexpert opinion testi-
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is 
the federal rule verbatim Rule 56(2), Utah 
Rules of Evidence (1971) was substantially the 
same 
Cross-Referenees. — Blood tests to deter-
mine parentage, expert testimony, §§ 78-25-18 
to 78-25-23, 78-45a-7 to 78-45a-10 
(1971) Rule 56(1), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971), contained similar language 
Relation to expert testimony. 
Trial court properly admitted testimony of a 
security guard, who compared a photograph of 
a footprint to the footprints that he saw at bur-
glarized premises The fact that a question 
might be capable of scientific determination 
does not make lay opinion inadmissible if the 
provisions of this rule are met State v Ellis, 
748 P 2d 188 (Utah 1987) 
mony as to weather conditions, 56 A L R 3d 
575 
Competency of nonexpert witness to testify, 
in criminal case, based upon personal observa-
tion, as to whether person was under the influ-
ence of drugs, 21 A L R 4th 905 
Discovery of expeita opinion Rule 26'bw4^ 
U R C P 
Drug paraphernalia expert opinion in deter-
mining nature of object as § 58-37a-4 
Pretrial conference, consideration of limiting 
number of expert witnesses, Rule 16, U R C P 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
£ni. JUT. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur 2d Appeal and Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=» 756, 
Error §§ 691 to 701. 758 3. 
C.J.S. — 5 C J S Appeal and Error §§ 1316 
to 1332 
Rule 28. Prehearing conference. 
The court may direct the attorneys for the parties to appear before the 
court, a justice, judge, or an appointed referee for a prehearing conference to 
consider the simplification of the issues and such other matters as may aid in 
the disposition of the proceeding by the court. The court, justice, judge, or 
appointed referee shall make an order which recites the action taken at the 
conference and the agreements made by the parties as to any of the matters 
considered, and which limits the issues to those not disposed of by admissions 
or agreements of counsel, and such order when entered controls the subse-
quent course of the proceeding, unless modified to prevent manifest injustice. 
Rule 29. Oral argument. 
(a) In general. Oral argument will be allowed in all cases unless the court 
concludes: 
(1) The appeal is frivolous; or 
(2) The dispositive issue or set of issues has been recently authorita-
tively decided; or 
(3) The facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the 
briefs and record and the decisional process would not be significantly 
aided by oral argument. 
(b) Priority of argument. Cases shall be scheduled for oral argument in 
accordance with the following list of priorities: 
(1) Appeals from convictions in which the death penalty has been im-
posed; 
(2) Appeals from convictions in all other criminal matters; 
(3) Appeals from habeas corpus petitions and other post-conviction pro-
ceedings; 
(4) Appeals from orders concerning child custody or termination of pa-
rental rights; 
(5) Matters relating to the discipline of attorneys; 
(6) Matters relating to applicants who have failed to pass the bar ex-
amination; 
(7) Petitions for review of Industrial Commission orders; 
(8) Appeals from the orders of the Juvenile Court; 
(9) Appeals from actions involving public elections; 
(10) Petitions for review of Public Service Commission orders; 
(11) Appeals from interlocutory orders; 
(12) Questions certified to the Supreme Court by a court of the United 
States: 
(13) Original writ proceedings; 
(14) Petitions for certiorari that have been granted; 
(15) Petitions to review administrative agency orders not included 
within other categories; and 
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(16) Any matter not included within the above categories. 
(c) Notice by clerk and request by a party for argument; postpone-
ment. Not later than 30 days prior to the term of court in which a case is to be 
submitted, the clerk shall give notice to all parties that oral argument is to be 
permitted, the time and place of oral argument, and the time to be allowed 
each side. Oral argument shall proceed as scheduled unless all parties waive 
the same in writing filed with the clerk not later than 15 days from the date of 
the clerk's notice. A request for postponement of the argument or for allow-
ance of additional time must be made by motion filed reasonably in advance of 
the date fixed for hearing. 
(d) Order and content of argument. The appellant is entitled to open and 
conclude the argument. The opening argument shall include a fair statement 
of the case. Counsel will not be permitted to read at length from briefs, records 
or authorities. 
(e) Cross and separate appeals. A cross or separate appeal shall be ar-
gued with the initial appeal at a single argument, unless the court otherwise 
directs. If a case involves a cross-appeal, the plaintiff in the action below shall 
be deemed the appellant for the purpose of this rule unless the parties other-
wise agree or the court otherwise directs. If separate appellants support the 
same argument, care shall be taken to avoid duplication of argument. 
(f) Non-appearance of parties. If the appellee fails to appear to present 
argument, the court will hear argument on behalf of the appellant, if present. 
If the appellant fails to appear, the court may hear argument on behalf of the 
appellee, if present. If neither party appears, the case may be decided on the 
briefs, or the court may direct that the case be rescheduled for argument. 
(g) Submission on briefs. By agreement of the parties, a case may be 
submitted for decision on the briefs, but the court may direct that the case be 
argued. 
(h) Use of physical exhibits at argument; removal. If physical exhibits 
other than documents are to be used at the argument, counsel shall arrange to 
have them placed in the courtroom before the court convenes on the date of 
the argument. After the argument, counsel shall remove the exhibits from the 
courtroom unless the court otherwise directs. If exhibits are not reclaimed by 
counsel within a reasonable time after notice is given by the clerk, they shall 
be destroyed or otherwise disposed of as the clerk shall think best. 
Advisory Committee Note. — The former The rule incorporates the oral argument pri-
practice was to presume that argument was ority classification formerly found in the ad-
waived unless requested The amendments mimstrative orders of the Supreme Court 
change the practice to presume that argument 
is requested unless expressly waived 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments C.J.S. — 5 C J S Appeal and Error ^ 1401-
in Utah Law — The Utah Court of Appeals, Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error *» 824 
1988 Utah L Rev 150 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am Jur 2d Appeal and 
Error §§ 697 to 699 
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ijy narrow rormalistic interpretations 2. Findings 
which disregarded the spirit and letter of Finding that trustee will be able to 
the section. Wright v. Union Cent. Life
 1 > a v t h e -economic depreciation" on the 
Ins. Co., Ind.1040, 61 S.Ct. 19o\ 311 U.S. „ecured creditor's equipment so as to ap-
273, 85 L.Ed. 184, 44 Am Bankr.Kep.N.S. proximately preserve their status quo 
280, rehearing denied 61 S.Ct. 445, 312 17.
 w a 8 n o t dear ly erroneous. In re Bermec 
S. 711. 85 L.Ed. 1142. Corporation, C.A.N.Y.1071, 445 F.2d 367. 
§ 362. Automatic stay 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition 
filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title operates as a stay, 
applicable to all entities, of— 
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance 
or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other 
proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been com-
menced before the commencement of the case under this title, or 
to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title; 
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of 
the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of 
the case under this title; 
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or 
of property from the estate; 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against prop-
erty of the estate; 
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of 
the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim 
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; 
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the 
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under 
this title; 
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose be-
fore the commencement of the case under this title against any 
claim against the debtor; and 
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before 
the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor. 
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this 
title does not operate as a stay— 
(1) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement 
or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the 
debtor; 
(2) under subsection (a) of this section, of the collection of 
alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not prop-
erty of the estate; 
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(3) under subsection (a) of this section, of any act to perfect 
an interest in property to the extent that the trustee's rights and 
powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of this 
title; 
' (4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commence-
ment or continuation of an action or proceeding by a govern-
mental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regula-
tory power; 
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforce-
ment of a judgment, other than a money judgment, obtained in 
an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such 
governmental unit's police or regulatory power; 
(6) under subsection (a)(7) of this section, of the setoff of 
any mutual debt and claim that are commodity futures contracts, 
forward commodity contracts, leverage transactions, options, 
warrants, rights to purchase or sell commodity futures contracts 
or securities, or options to purchase or sell commodities or securi-
ties; 
(7) under subsection (a) of this section, of the commencement 
of any action by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment to foreclose a mortgage or deed of trust in any case in 
which the mortgage or deed of trust held by said Secretary is 
insured or was formerly insured under the National Housing 
Act and covers property, or combinations of property, consisting 
of five or more living units; or 
(8) under subsection (a) of this section, of the issuance to the 
debtor by a governmental unit of a notice of tax deficiency. 
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d), (e), and (f) of this 
section— 
(1) the stay of an act against property of the estate under sub-
section (a) of this section continues until such property is no 
longer property of the estate; and 
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this 
section continues until the earliest of— 
(A) the time the case is closed f 
(B) the time the case is dismissed; and 
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title con-
cerning an individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, or 13 
of this title, the time a discharge is granted or denied. 
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(d) On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hear-
ing, the court shall grant relief from the stay provided under sub-
section (a) of this section, such as by terminating, annulling, modify-
ing, or conditioning such stay— 
(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an 
interest in property of such party in interest; or 
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property, if— 
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; 
and 
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorgani-
zation. 
(e) Thirty days after a request under subsection (d) of this section 
for relief from the stay of any act against property of the estate 
under subsection (a) of this section, such stay is terminated with 
respect to the party in interest making such request, unless the 
court, after notice and a hearing, orders such stay continued in 
effect pending, or as a result of, a final hearing and determination 
under subsection (d) of this section. A hearing under this sub-
section may be a preliminary hearing, or may be consolidated with 
the final hearing under subsection (d) of this section. If the hearing 
under this subsection is a preliminary hearing— 
(1) the court shall order such stay so continued if there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the party opposing relief from such 
stay will prevail at the final hearing under subsection (d) of this 
section; and 
(2) such final hearing shall be commenced within thirty days 
after such preliminary hearing. 
(f) The court, without a hearing, shall grant such relief from the 
stay provided under subsection (a) of this section as is necessary to 
prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an entity in property, 
if such interest will suffer such damage before there is an opportunity 
for notice and a hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section. 
(g) In any hearing under subsection (d) or (e) of this section 
concerning relief from the stay of any act under subsection (a) of 
this section— 
(1) the party requesting such relief has the burden of proof 
on the issue of the debtor's equity in property; and 
(2) the party opposing such relief has the burden of proof on 
all other issues. 
Pub.L. 95-598, Nov. 6,1978, 92 Stat. 2570. 
Ch. 3 ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS 11 § 362 
H i s t o r i c a l a n d R e v i s i o n N o t e s 
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, 
Senate Report No. 95-98©. The automatic 
stay if* one of the fundamental debtor 
protections provided by the bankruptcy 
laws. It gives the debtor a breathing 
Hpell from his creditors. It stops all 
collection efforts, all harassment, and all 
foreclosure actions. It permits the debt-
or to attempt a repayment or reorganiza-
tion plan, or simply to be relieved of the 
financial pressures that drove him into 
bankruptcy. 
The action commenced by the party 
seeking relief from the stay is referred 
to as a motion to make it clear that at 
the expedited hearing under subsection 
(e), and at hearings on relief from the 
stay, the only issue will be the lack of 
adequate protection, the debtor's equity 
in the property, and the necessity of the 
property to an effective reorganization of 
the debtor, or the existence of other cause 
for relief from the stay. This hearing 
will not be the appropriate time at which 
to bring in other issues, such as counter-
claims against the creditor, which, al-
though relevant to the question of the 
amount of the debt, concern largely col-
lateral or unrelated matters. This ap-
proach is consistent with that taken in 
cases such as In re Essex Properties, Ltd., 
430 F.Supp. 1112 (N.D.Cal.1977), that an 
action seeking relief from the stay Is not 
the assertion of a claim which would give 
rise to the right or obligation to assert 
counterclaims. Those counterclaims are 
not to be handled in the summary fashion 
that the preliminary hearing under this 
provision will be. Rather, they will be 
the subject of more complete proceedings 
by the trustee to recover property of the 
estate or to object to the allowance of a 
claim. However, this would not preclude 
the party seeking continuance of the stay 
from presenting evidence on the existence 
of claims which the court may consider 
in exercising its discretion. What is pre-
cluded is a determination of such col-
lateral claims on the merits at the hear-
ing. 
[For additional discussion, see Notes of 
the Committee on the Judiciary, Senate 
Report No. 95-989, set out under section 
361 of this title.] 
Notes of Committee on the Judiciary, 
House Report No. 05-595. Paragraph (7) 
[of 8ubsec. (a)] stays setoffs of mutual 
debts and credits between the debtor and 
creditors. As with all other paragraphs 
not affect the right ot creditors. It sim-
ply stays itH enforcement pending an or-
derly examination of the debtor's and 
creditors' rights. 
Legislative Statements. Section 
362(a)(1) of the House amendment adopts 
the provision contained in the Senate 
amendment enjoining the commencement 
or continuation of a judicial, administra-
tive, or other proceeding to recover a 
claim against the debtor that arose be-
fore the commencement of the case. The 
provision is beneficial and interacts with 
section 362(a)(6), which also covers as-
sessment, to prevent harassment of the 
debtor with respect to pre-petition 
claims. 
Section 362(a)(7) contains a provision 
contained in H.R. 8200 as passed by the 
House. The differing provision in the 
Senate amendment was rejected. It is 
not possible that a debt owing to the 
debtor may be offset against an interest 
in the debtor. 
Section 362(a)(8) is new. The provision 
stays the commencement or continuation 
of any proceeding concerning the debtor 
before the U. S. Tax Court. 
Section 362(b)(4) indicates that the 
stay under section 362(a)(1) does not ap-
ply to affect the commencement or con-
tinuation of an action or proceeding by a 
governmental unit to enforce the govern-
mental unit's police or regulatory power. 
This section is intended to be given a 
narrow construction in order to permit 
governmental units to pursue actions to 
protect the public health and safety and 
not to apply to actions by a governmen-
tal unit to protect a pecuniary interest in 
property of the debtor or property of the 
estate. 
Section 362(b)(6) of the House amend-
ment adopts a provision contained in the 
Senate amendment restricting the excep-
tion to the automatic stay with respect 
to setoffs to permit only the setoff of 
mutual debts and claims. Traditionally, 
the right of setoff has been limited to 
mutual debts and claims and the lack of 
the clarifying term "mutual" in H.R. 8200 
as passed by the House created an unin-
tentional ambiguity. Section 362(b)(7) of 
the House amendment permits the issu-
ance of a notice of tax deficiency. The 
House amendment rejects section 
362(b)(7) in the Senate amendment. It 
would have permitted a particular gov-
16-10-13 CORPORATIONS 
16-10-13. Service of process on corporation — Registered 
agent or division director as agents for receipt of 
service. 
(1) The registered agent appointed by a corporation is the agent of the 
corporation upon whom any process, notice, or demand required or permitted 
by law to be served upon the corporation may be served. 
(2) Whenever a corporation fails to appoint or maintain a registered agent 
to this state, or whenever its registered agent cannot with reasonable dili-
gence be found at the registered office, then the director of the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code is the agent of the corporation upon whom 
any process, notice, or demand may be served. Service on the director of the 
Division of Corporations and Commercial Code of any process, notice, or de-
mand shall be made by delivering to and leaving with him, or with any clerk 
having charge of the corporation department of that office, an original and one 
copy of the process, notice, or demand. In the event any process, notice, or 
demand is served on the director of the Division of Corporations and Commer-
cial Code, he shall immediately cause one of the copies to be forwarded by 
registered or certified mail, addressed to the corporation at its registered 
office. Any service upon the director of the Division of Corporations and Com-
mercial Code shall be returnable in not less than 30 days. 
(3) The Division of Corporations and Commercial Code shall keep a record 
of all processes, notices, and demands served upon it under this section, and 
shall record the time of the service and its action on the service. 
(4) Nothing contained in this section limits or affects the right to serve any 
process, notice, or demand required or permitted by law to be served upon a 
corporation in any other manner permitted by law. 
History: L. 1961, ch. 28, § 13; 1979,, ch. 57, 
§ 2; 1984, ch. 66, § 84; 1985, ch. 178, § 32. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1984 amend-
ment substituted references to Division of Cor-
porations and Commercial Code and its direc-
tor for references to secretary of state through-
out the section. 
The 1985 amendment substituted "is the 
agent of the corporation" in Subsection (1) for 
"shall be an agent of such corporation"; substi-
tuted "fails to appoint" near the beginning of 
Subsection (2) for "shall fail to appoint"; substi-
tuted "is the agent of the corporation upon 
whom any process, notice, or demand may be 
served" at the end of the first sentence of Sub-
section (2) for "shall be an agent of such corpo-
ration upon whom any such process, notice, or 
demand may be served"; substituted "an origi-
nal and one copy of the process, notice, or de-
mand" at the end of the second sentence of Sub-
section (2) for "duplicate copies of such process, 
notice, or demand"; deleted "thereof " in the 
third sentence after "one of the copies"; substi-
tuted "any service upon the director" at the 
beginning of the fourth sentence for "any ser-
vice so had on the director"; substituted "the 
time of the service and its action on the ser-
vice" at the end of Subsection (3) for therein 
the time of such service and its action with 
reference thereto"; substituted "this section 
limits or affects" near the beginning of Subsec-
tion (4) for "this section shall limit or affect"; 
and made minor changes in phraseology. 
Cross-References. — Assumed name, per-
sons doing business under, § 42-2-11. 
Personal service upon corporation in state, 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 4(e)(4). 
Service on foreign corporations, § 16-10-111. 
96 
31A-2-310 INSURANCE CODE 
"agents" for "attorneys" in Subsections (2) 
and (3), and made minor stylistic changes 
throughout the section 
Compiler's Notes. — The references to 
§ 31A-15-101 in Subsection (l)(c) seem mcor 
rect That section deals with the purposes of 
Chapter 15 Section 31A-15-102 deals with 
assisting unauthorized insurers 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Foreign insurance company 
—Claims arising within state 
Out-of-state claims 
Foreign insurance company. 
—Claims arising within state. 
All legal service against a foreign insur-
ance company for causes of action arising 
within the state of Utah is to be served on the 
Utah insurance commissioner Gibbons & 
Reed Co v Standard Accident Ins Co , 191 
F Supp 174 (D Utah 1960) 
Out-of-state claims. 
Foreign insurer with an office in Utah was 
served through insurance commissioner of 
Utah and was required to defend a cause of 
action arising out-of-state Gibbons & Reed 
Co v Standard Accident Ins Co, 191 F 
Supp 174 (D Utah 1960) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — In Personam Juris-
diction Expanded Utah's Long-Arm Statute, 
1970 Utah L Rev 222 
C.J.S. — 44 C J S Insurance §S#82, 83, 84, 
46 C J S Insurance § 1626 
A.L.R. — Federal or state law as control-
ling, in diversity action, whether foreign cor-
poration is amenable to service of process in 
s t a t e ,6ALR3dl l03 
Attorney representing foreign corporation 
in litigation as its agent for service of process 
in unconnected actions or proceedings, 9 
A L R 3d 738 
Who is "general" or "managing" agent of 
foreign corporation under statute authonzmg 
service of process on such agent, 17 A L R 3d 
625 
Validity, as a matter of due process of 
state statutes or rules of court conferring in 
personam jurisdiction over nonresident or 
foreign corporations on the basis of isolated 
business transaction within state, 20 
A L R 3d 1201 
Construction and application of state stat-
utes or rules of court predicating in personam 
jurisdiction over nonresidents or foreign cor-
porations on making or performing a contract 
within the state, 23 A L R 3d 551 
Jurisdictional acts described in statutes 
dealing with insurance contracts, 23 
A L R 3d 606 
Construction and application, as to isolated 
acts oi transactions, of state statutes or rules 
of court predicating in personam jurisdiction 
over nonresidents or foreign corporations 
upon the doing of an act or upon doing or 
transacting business or "any" business, 
within a state, 27 A L R 3d 397 
Personal liability of stockholder, officer or 
agent for debt of foreign corporation doing 
business in the state 27 A L R 4th 387 
Key Numbers. — Insurance «=> 16 26 
31A-2-310. Procedure for service of process through 
state officer. 
(1) Service upon the commissioner or lieutenant governor under 
§ 31A-2-309 is service on the principal, if 
(a) two copies of the process are delivered personally or to the office 
of the official designated in § 31A-2-309, and 
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(b) that official mails a copy of the process to the person to be served 
according to Subsection (2)(b). 
(2) (a) The commissioner and the lieutenant governor shall give re-
ceipts for and keep records of all process served through them. 
(b) The commissioner or the lieutenant governor shall immediately 
send by certified mail one copy of the process received to the person to 
be served at that person's last known principal place of business, resi-
dence, or post-office address. The commissioner or the lieutenant gov-
ernor shall retain the other copy for his files. 
(c) No plaintiff or complainant may take a judgment py default in 
any proceeding in which process is served under this settion and 
§ 31A-2-309 until the expiration of 40 days from the date of service of 
process under Subsection (2Kb). 
(3) Proof of service shall be evidenced by a certificate by the official 
designated in § 31A-2-309, showing service made upon him and mailing by 
him, and attached to a copy of the process presented to him for that pur-
pose. 
(4) When process is served under § 31A-2-310, the words "twenty days" 
in the first sentence of Rule 12(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure shall 
be changed to read "forty days." 
History: C. 1953, 31A-2-310, enacted by § 31A-2-309" following "lieutenant gover-
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 7 ; L 1986, ch. 204, § 27. nor" in the first sentence and substituted 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- "commissioner or the lieutenant governor" 
ment, effective July 1, 1986, in Subsection for "official" in the second sentence. 
(2)(b), deleted "official designated in 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 84. 
Key Numbers. — Insurance *» 26. 
31A-2-311. Reciprocal enforcement of foreign decrees. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Reciprocal state" means a state whose laws contain procedures 
substantially similar to those specified in this section for the enforce-
ment of decrees or orders issued by courts located in other states 
against an insurer authorized to do business in the reciprocal state, 
and which recognizes Utah as a reciprocal state under its law. 
(b) "Foreign decree" means a decree or order of a court located in a 
reciprocal state, including a United States court located in a reciprocal 
state against an insurer authorized to do business in Utah. 
(2) The commissioner shall determine which states qualify as reciprocal 
states and shall maintain a list of them. 
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(b) upon request and if available exhibit his operator's license to any 
investigating peace officer present and to the person struck or the opera-
tor or occupant of or person attending any vehicle or owner of other 
property damaged in the accident; and 
(c) render to any person injured in the collision reasonable assistance, 
including the transporting, or the making of arrangements for the trans-
porting, of the person to a physician, surgeon, or hospital for medical or 
surgical treatment if it is apparent that treatment is necessary or if the 
transporting is requested by the injured person. 
(2) The operator of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to 
or death of any person or property damage to an apparent extent of $400 or 
more shall immediately and by the quickest means of communication avail-
able give notice of the accident to the nearest office of an authorized law 
enforcement agency. 
(3) When the operator of a vehicle is physically incapable of giving an 
immediate notice of an accident as required in Subsections (1) and (2) and 
there is another occupant in the vehicle at the time of the accident capable of 
doing so, the occupant shall give or cause to be given the notice not given by 
the operator. 
(4) When the operator is physically incapable of making a written report of 
an accident when required under Section 41-6-35 and he is not the owner of 
the vehicle, then the owner of the vehicle involved in the accident shall within 
15 days after becoming aware of the accident make the report not made by the 
operator. 
History-* L. 1941, ch. 52, § 21; C. 1943, "operated" for "driven," m Subsection (l)(a) m-
57-7-98; L. 1983, ch. 183, § 32; 1987, ch. 138, serted "to any person involved" at the begin-
§ 25. ning, and m Subsection (l)(b) inserted "to any 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- investigating peace officer present and," sub-
ment redesignated the previously undesig- stituted "operator" for "driver," substituted "or 
nated provisions of this section as amended by owner of other property damaged in the acci-
Laws 1983, ch. 183, § 32; in Subsection (1), in dent" for "collided with and shall", made minor 
the introductory paragraph substituted "opera- changes in phraseology and punctuation 
tor" for "driver," inserted "or other property" throughout Subsection (1); and added present 
following "damage to any vehicle," substituted Subsections (2) through (4). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 A Am Jur 2d Automo- tor of a motor vehicle not to carry or display his 
biles and Highway Traffic § 294 operator's license or the vehicle registration 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of stat- certificate, 6 A L.R.3d 506. 
ute making it a criminal offense for the opera-
41-6-32. Collision with unattended vehicle or other prop-
erty — Duties of operator. 
The operator of a vehicle which collides with or is involved in an accident 
with any vehicle or other property which is unattended and which results in 
damage to the other vehicle or property shall immediately stop and either 
locate and notify the operator or owner of the vehicle or the owner of other 
property of the operator's name and address and the registration number of 
the vehicle causing the damage, or shall attach securely in a conspicuous 
place on the vehicle or other property a written notice giving the operator's 
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name and address and the registration number of the vehicle causing the 
damage. If applicable, the operator shall also give notice under Subsections 
41-6-31(2) and (3). 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 22; C. 1943, 31(2) and (3)" for "as provided in Section 
57-7-99; L. 1977, ch. 269, § 2; 1987, ch. 138, 41-6-34 " omitted the former last sentence, 
§ 26. which read "Any person failing to comply with 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- said requirements under such circumstances is 
ment substituted "operator" for "driver" guilty of an infraction" and made minor 
throughout the section, in the present last sen- changes m phraseology and punctuation 
tence substituted "under Subsections 41-6- throughout the section 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 60 C J S Motor Vehicles § 43 
Key Numbers. — Automobiles «=* 10 
41-6-33, 41-6-34. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Section 41-6-33 (L 1941, ch 52, Laws L987, ch 138, § 106, repeals § 41-6-34 
k 23, C 1943, 57-7-100), relating to accidents as last amended by Laws 1979, ch 242, § 7, 
resulting only in damage to fixtures legally concerning reporting accidents involving m-
upon or adjacent to a highway, was repealed by jury, death, or damage of $400 or more For 
Laws 1977, ch 269, § 6 present provisions, see § 41-6-31 
41-6-35. Accident reports — Duty of operator and investi-
gative officer to forward or render. 
(1) The department may request any operator of a vehicle involved in an 
accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or total property damage 
to the apparent extent of $400 or more to, within ten days after the request, 
forward a written report of the accident to the department. 
(2) The department may require any operator of a vehicle involved in an 
accident, of which report is made under Subsection (1), to file supplemental 
reports when the original report is insufficient in the opinion of the depart-
ment and may require witnesses of accidents to render reports to the depart-
ment. 
(3) A written accident report is not required under this section from any 
person who is physically incapable of making a report, during his period of 
incapacity. 
(4) Every peace officer, who in the regular course of duty, investigates a 
motor vehicle accident described under Subsection (1), shall file a report of the 
accident with the department within ten days after completing the investiga-
tion. The report shall be made either at the time of and at the scene of the 
accident or later by interviewing participants or witnesses. 
(5) The written reports required to be filed with the department by peace 
officers and the information in them are not privileged or confidential. 
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 25; C. 1943, amendment, effective July 1, 1986, inserted 
57-7-102; L. 1949, ch. 65, § 1; 1961, ch. 86, "department may request any" and substituted 
§ 1; 1969, ch. 106, § 1; 1973, ch. 82, § 1; 1979, "to within ten days after the request" for "shall 
ch. 242, § 8; 1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 1; 1987, within five days after such accident" and "the 
ch. 138, § 27. accident" for "such accident" in Subsection (a), 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 (2nd S S ) substituted "is made under Subsection (a)" for 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 36 Am Jur id rore.sm Cor- C.J.S. — 20 C J S Corporations * 1960 
porations ^ 63 Key Numbers. — Corporations «=> 678 
PART 8 
NUISANCES 
76-10-801. "Nuisance" defined — Violation — Classifica-
tion of offense. 
(1) A nuisance is any item, thing, manner, condition whatsoever that is 
dangerous to human life or health or renders soil, air, water, or food impure or 
unwholesome. 
(2) Any person, whether as owner, agent, or occupant who creates, aids in 
creating, or contributes to a nuisance, or who supports, continues, or retains a 
nuisance, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-801, enacted by L. Boards of health to abate, sv 26-24-14 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-801. Brothels declared a nuisance, * 47-1-1 
Cross-References. — Alcoholic be\erages 
property used in connection with declared nui-
sance i* 32A-13-6 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Civil liability for violation of section. Branch \ Western Petroleum, Inc . 657 P 2d 
Defendant could be held liable under the doc- 267 (Utah 1982) 
trine of nuisance per se for the pollution of Liabiht\ for damages for injuries occasioned 
plaintiffs culinary water wells caused b\ the by fumes, gases, dust, smoke, foul air, and ob-
percolation of defendant's toxic formation noxious odors, being cast upon one's property 
waters, which were stored on defendant s land. b\ another was not absolute, and law did not 
into the subterranean water system that fed afford redress for every such discomfort or an-
plaintifFs wells where the acts of the defendant novance. extreme rights in this regard could 
were in violation of this section and former not be enforced Dahl \ Utah Oil Ref Co., 71 
§ 73-14-5. wnich was in effect at the time. Utah 1, 11, 262 P 269 (1927) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am Jur 2d Nui-ances Operation of incinerator as nuisance, 41 
& 1, 403 A L R 3 d 1009 
C.J.S. — 66 C .JS Nuisances fc 8 Zoo as a nuisance, 55 A L R 3d 1126 
A.L.R. — Keeping pigs as a nuisance 2 p0rnoshops or similar places disseminating 
A L R 3 d 931 obscene materials as nuisance, 55 A L.R 3d 
Keeping poultry as nuisance. 2 A L R 3d 
965 
Electric generating plant or transformer
 &ta-
 A i r P o r t operations or flight of aircraft as nui-
tion as nuisance, 4 A L R 3d 902 sance, 79 A L R 3d 253 
Keeping horses as nuisance. 27 ~A L R 3d Key Numbers. — Nuisance <?=> 59 
627 
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76-10-803. "Public nuisance" defined. 
(1) A public nuisance is a crime against the order and economy of the state 
and consists in unlawfully doing any act or omitting to perform any duty, 
which act or omission either 
(a) Annoys, injures, or endangers the comfort, repose, health, or safety 
of three or more persons, or 
(b) Offends public decency, or 
(c) Unlawfully interferes with, obstructs, or tends to obstruct, or ren-
ders dangerous for passage, any lake, stream, canal, or basin, or any 
public park, square, street, or highway, or 
(d) In any way renders three or more persons insecure in life or the use 
of property 
(2) An act which affects three or more persons in any of the ways specified 
m this section is still a nuisance regardless of the extent of annoyance or 
damage inflicted on individuals is unequal 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-803, enacted by L. 
1973, ch! 196, k 76-10-803. 
Cross-References. — Pornograph\ offenses 




Motive or intent 
Prescriptive rights 
Canals. 
Discharge into canal waters used b\ three or 
more persons for irrigation and domestic pur-
poses, of water that rendered canal waters 
unfit for such purposes created public nui-
sance North Point Consol Irrigation Co \ 
Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co , 16 Utah 246, 52 
P 1 6 8 , 4 0 L R A 851 67 Am St R 607(1898) 
Lawful business. 
Where party so used his property as to 
annoy, injure, or endanger comfort, repose, 
health, or safety of three or more persons, his 
Uta« Law Review. — Comment Air Pollu-
tion, Nuisance Law, and Private Litigation, 
1971 Utah L Rev 142 
Comment, State v Rabe No Preseizure Ad-
versary Hearing Required under Nuisance 
Theory of Obscenity, 1971 Utah L Rev 582 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am Ju r 2d Nuisances 
§§ 35, 36 
Weeds failure to control as maintaining 
public nuisance, ^ 4-17-8 
acts were unlawful and he was liable for them, 
even though in committing such unlawful acts, 
he wa^ in pursuit of lawful business and was 
conducting such business in reasonable and 
careful manner People v Burtleson, 14 Utah 
258 47 P 87 (1896) 
Motive or intent. 
In determining question of nuisance, motive 
or intent with which act complained of was 
committed could not be considered People \ 
Burtleson 14 Utah 258, 47 P 87 (1896) 
Prescriptive rights. 
There could be no prescriptive right to main-
tain public nuisance North Point Consol Irri-
gation Co \ Utah & Salt Lake Canal Co , 16 
Utah 246, 52 P 168, 40 L R A 851, 67 Am St 
R 607 (1898) 
C.J.S — 66 C J S Nuisances t> 2 
A.L.R. — Pornoshops or similar places dis-
seminating obscene materials as nuisance, 55 
A L R 3 d 1134 
LiabihU of private landowner for vegetation 
obscuring view at highwa> or street intersec-
tion 69 A L R 4th 1092 
Key Numbers. — Nuisance «= 59 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
345 
OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH 76-10-808 
action. If the action is instituted, however, to abate the distribution or exhibi-
tion of material alleged to offend public decency, the action shall be in the 
form prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure of Utah for injunctions, but no 
restraining order or injunction shall issue except upon notice to the person 
sought to be enjoined; and that person shall be entitled to a trial of the issues 
commencing within three days after filing of an answer to the complaint and a 
decision shall be rendered by the court within two days after the conclusion of 
the trial. As used in this part, ''distribute," "exhibit/ ' and "material" mean the 
same as provided in section 76-10-1201. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-806, enacted by L. Prosecution of pornography offenses by 
1973, ch. 196, ^ 76-10-806; 1977, ch. 92, \ 1. county or city attorney, fc 76-10-1215. 
Cross-References. — Actions to abate nui-
sances, ^ 78-38-1 et seq 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 58 Am Jur 2d Nuisances C.J.S. — 66 C.J.S Nuisances ^ 111 
§fc 50, 232. 412 Key Numbers. — Nuisance o 79. 
A.L.R. — Business interruption, without 
physical damage, as actionable. 65 A L R 4th 
1126 
76-10-807. Reserved. 
76-10-808. Relief granted for public nuisance. 
If the existence of a public nuisance as defined by Subsection 
76-10-803(l)(b) is admitted or established, either in a civil or criminal pro-
ceeding, a judgment shall be entered which shall: 
(a) Permanently enjoin each defendant and any other person from fur-
ther maintaining the nuisance at the place complained of and each defen-
dant from maintaining such nuisance elsewhere; 
(b) Direct the person enjoined to surrender to the sheriff of the county 
in which the action was brought any material in his possession which is 
subject to the injunction, and the sheriff shall seize and destroy this mate-
rial; and 
(c) Without proof of special injury direct that an accounting be had and 
alimonies and other consideration paid as admission to view any motion 
picture film determined to constitute a public nuisance, or paid for any 
publication determined to constitute a public nuisance, in either case 
without deduction for expenses, be forfeited and paid into the general 
funfl of the county where the nuisance was maintained. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-808, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Pornographic motion 
1977, ch. 92, ft 2. * picture films, § 76-10-1216 et seq 
347 
NUISANCE, WASTE AND OTHER DAMAGE 78-38-1 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. —Attorney's Fees in 
Utah, 1984 Utah L Rev 553 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 55 Am Ju r 2d Mortgages 
§ 625 et seq 
C.J.S. — 59 C J S Mortgages * 812 
A.L.R. — Attorney's compensation in ab-
sence of contract or statute fixing amount. 57 
A L R 3 d 475 
Attorney's fees in matters in\olving real 
property mortgages and deeds of trust, 58 
A L R 3 d 215 
Key Numbers. — Mortgages c=» 581(5) 
CHAPTER 38 










"Nuisance" defined — Right of ac-
tion for — Judgment 
Right of action for waste — Dam-
ages 
Right of action for injuries to trees 
— Damage 
Limited damages in certain cases 
Proof of ownership required to har-
vest or transport forest products 
or native vegetation —- Defini-
tions — Requirements for proof 
of ownership 
Enforcement 
Transportation of forest products 
Section 
or native vegetation into or 
through the state. 
78-38-4 8 Exemptions 
78-38-4 9 Violation as misdemeanor 
78-38-5 Manufacturing facility in opera-
tion over three \ears — Limited 
application of nuisance pro\i-
sions 
78-38-6 "Manufacturing facility" defined 
78-38-7 Agricultural operation of over 
three years duration — Appli-
cation of nuisance provisions 
limited 
78-38-8 "Agricultural operation" defined 
78-38-1. "Nuisance" defined — Right of action for — Judg-
ment. 
Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent, or offensive to the 
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the 
comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance and the subject of an 
action. Such action may be brought by any person whose property is injuri-
ously affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by [the] nuisance; and 
by the judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or abated, and damages may 
also be recovered. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-38-1. 
Cross-References. — Criminal nuisances, 
§ 76-10-801 et seq 
Municipal power to declare and abate nui-
sances, § 10-8-60 
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